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Introduction
The government of Guana has made three m::ijor efforts at "development"
in this century (see f,lgure 1 and T.a~le 2).

'I'he f:,.rst (1900-1920) may be

referred to as the "openin3-up" or "e::ir1.y c olon~.81 11 pe?:"iod.

'i'he second

(1920-26) is usually called the Gugg1.s"!J~rg Pbn d!:er the Governor \·1ho was
its major driving force.

The th:!.rd (1945-1965) consisted of two rounds: a

British "late colonial II or pre-inde~,endence round centered upon the Develop
ment Plan of 1951, and the Nkrumah round beginning af;:er 1960.
This essay examines the strategies and results of each of these plans
with particular eraphasis on the colonial period.

1

Its main con~lusion,

simply stated, is that the colonial government's efforts were unproductive
to a surprising degree and its policies, taken as a iihole, probably retarded
the rate of growth of the economy.

'Ehe government eJttracted a large surplus

from the Ghanaian private ~ector, tne main driving force in the economy,
but gave little in return and acted of•:en to frus!:rate tl~e developcaent of

Ghanaian capital.

It devoted raost of t:.s effort to e,q,:mding the government

sector or promoting foreign er/..:~-::prir.e, neither of wh:.ch contributed propor
tionate returns to the economy.

':Che rerul~ u:?n a

r .lgh1y

undesirable economic

structure, i, e, an inef...ficient (fror.1 the po:i.r..t of vie~-, of economic grm·1th)

state bureaucracy, a sluggish aad rcluctnnt f0i:d.gn bus~~nees sector, and
an underdeveloped Ghana:.l'.an bus:!.ness se-:tor.
If this conclusion seeras sm:p:::ts~.ns, it sho1.1ld be noted that the

primary goal of the colonial adr.1:!.rdstr;;:tors w:c:s not econora:!.c growth but the
t1aintenance of a certain political structure; a task they h-::<l to carry out

only limite d acces s to
witho ut any polit ica 1 base in Ghana itsel f and •with
. . 2
Decau se they lacke d the stren gth to
men an d raoney f ram Great Brita in.
the develo pment of
handl e the tensio ns of econo mic srowt h, they feared
r than an accel erato r
local bases of power and acted often as a brake rathe
ion, exch.'.'.n~e anc.1 the
in an atteo pt to slow down the growt h of speci alizat
3
After the Secon d Horld War, when the proble ms
accUL 1ulatio n of capit al.
istrat ors left.
becam e too acute to be handl ed in this way, the admin

That

ty was a quest ion of
they did so with a certa in amoun t of grace and digni
style rathe r than substa nce,

1. 1900- 1920

The proble m of under develo pment remain ed,

4

with the same
Colon ial admin istrat ors in 1900 did not vie,;-1 develo pment
Coast as an under develo ped
sertce of urgen cy as we do now but they sau the Gold
of the peopl e being
count ry ("the soil is ever>7'·1here fertil e and the needs
for brins ing about
few there is little incen tive to work" ), and had a plan
"impr oved metho ds and ne\·1 manne rs.

11

Their strate gy ·was outwa rd-loo king with

regard to ca?it al, enter prise and marke ts.

In their view, Afric a had a

r, and rich natur al
plent iful (thoug h not alway s t-Jilli ng) suppl y of labou
lackin g and these ,;-1ould
resou rces; capit al and enter prise were all that was
The colon ies were regard ed as "unde rdeve loped
5
ial assis tance ."
imper
ut
witho
ped
develo
be
never
can
uhich
es
estat
estate s and

have to be attain ed from abroad .

tary: a natur al basis
The Gold Coai:;t and Great Brita in were thus cor:1p lemen
for

11

y and the capit al•
co-op eratio n" e}dst ed bet\-1een the land- inten sive colon

-3intensive mother country; the role of the state ·was to break down barr:!.~rs
to exchange between the colony and the home governr.1ent, to provide fofra
structure and basic services in the colony, and to maintain a fayou:r.a:.ile
climate there for foreiga. investment.

This approach led the Br:Lt:ish to

overstress foreign markets and foreign capital, and to neglect ~r.ternel
markets and indigenous enterprise.
The first development "plan II for the Gold Coast was pt!t into effect
around 1900.
R I s:

Its strategy lJas to develop the country by folJ.cwin3 the three
medi-::al achizvements. 116

"Rule of the British, the Railways, and Ross'

The program was short, modest and, by appearancM

at leo:::t, highly su-:cessful.

The main thrust of the plan lay in the construction of a r.n::1Yay s::.. J th3
pacification of the country.

The government did not have sufficient rnvenue

at the tice to finance the entire program, but made up tbs d:afid.t by is::.u:1.ng
bonds in the London capital market.

The construction of a railway from

Sekondi to Kumasi was begun in 1098 and completed in 19C3.
pacified in 1901.

The Ashanti were

A beginning was made touard enlarging the admf-::.:!.i::~r.nt:tve

structure; and in 1904 the public debt stood at over two million pound~.
The decades that followed were marked by a rapid expansfon of e:q,orts,
and uith them, of the rest of the economy (Table 2).
pari passu:

Go,.1ernmcn~ re·:enue rose

the government could easily pay interest and amortize~ion on its

debt, and still have a large surplus at its disposal for t!1e oteady and
continuous elq>ansion of its services and infrastructure.

The goverm.1ent 's

satisfaction with the prosperity of the Gold Coast was no~. however, justified;

-4-

its o\-m contrib ution to the gro·wth process uas not the decisiv e factor, or
even an importa nt one.

Many of its policie s were misguid ed, and perhaps

counte r-produ ctive: much was done to encoura ge foreign investm ent in the
gold industr y, which was docina ted by Europe ans; but the African entert, rise
in cocoa, ,~hich accoun ted for the prospe rity of the colony, receive d scant
help, and even a certain amount of hindran ce.

It could be said in a sense

ent
that the cocoa industr y grew in spite of, rather than because of, governm
policy.

1.

7
Foreign capital in gold .
Ghana has a lortg history as a gold produc er; travell ers and soldier s

visitin g Ashant i had brough t back visions of fabulou s wealth.

The gold mines

had been in operati on since at least the early 16th century , but since African
ry
methods ~~ere inadequ ate for working deep mines, modern machin ery \'las necessa
for further development,

This was a classic exa1,1ple of the colonia l t,iodel:

ng
here was a rich ral-1 materia l, much in demand in world markets , but requiri
mechan ization an'd capita l which the colonia l adnini stratio n felt only the
Europea ns could bring.

The annual report of the Gold Coast in 1890 predict ed

that £40 million of gold uould be eJttract ed in ten years.
The aid of the goverm.1ent was essent ial for getting the gold industr y
on its feet.

Even though sorae rich mines were located relativ ely near the

the
coast, it was exceed inely ~ifficu lt and costly to transpo rt machin ery by
d
traditi onal means of head-lo ading, and the absence of a railroa d had thwarte

-5the efforts of Europeans to establish a eold raining industry in the later
1870's and early 1830's.

The European industry became successful only after

the construction of the railroad had provided it with cheap transportation.
The government also helped foreign capital to obtain adequate supplies
of labour, though not to the elctent that uas usual in colonial Africa.

Most

colonial governments, far froa believing in laissez-faire where labour ·was
concerned, regarded it an essential goverl1Iilent function to interfere in the
labour market and assure an adequate labour supply for the export sector of
the economy. 8 The colonial government of the Gold Coast began with the
usual premise that "one of the most serious problems connected with the Gold
Coast is the dearth of labour to i-,hich the character of the inhabitants largely
contributes 119 ; but it did not in fact take as strons measures to increase
the supply as did other colonial governr:ients.

At the turn of the century,

uhen the simultaneous deoands for labour in rJining, railroad construction,
a nd cocoa caused a shortage of labour in Ghana,

the government established

a Transport Depart1~1ent uitb the object of alleviating the conditions in which
"e~:orbitant rates had for sone tir11e been denanded by the carriers and paicl
to them by the mininc agents- 1110 This effort, houever, uas short lived, and
the Transport Departnent "t-1as disbanded in 1909.

The government also, at one

tirne, considered ll~porting Asian labourers to the Gold Coast, but only a
sr.1all nunber were brought in.

The governr:ient helped the gold industry in

its inland recruitinc ventures by arranging 8eetings between recruiters and
chiefs, but did not use coercion or compulsion.

-6-

One reason the governr,1ent did not do r:1ore to help foreign enterpris e
obtain labour in later years was that it had only liraited political control
of the colony, and thus lacked the pouer to control the labour market.

The

a dr.1inistra tion of Ghana uas not ar.:ibitious, and had a dual attitude toward
foreign capital: it welcoraed and encourage d foreign capital, but resented
the difficult ies it created for the smooth adrainistr ation of the colony. In
the 19th century, the r;overnrne nt's attempt to institute a poll tax had met
with stiff resistanc e from the populatio n, and it had no wish to raise the
issue again unless forced to do so.

The colony was prosperin g due to the

rapid expansion of cocoa, and the labour problems of the Ghanaian sector of
the economy were beyond the governme nt's horizons.

The colonial administr ation

l·7as quite happy to be relieved of pressure to act on labour problems in this
period.

The eoverrunen t was not able to help European investors by seizing

mineral rights, but it allouecl the negotiatio ns of concessio ns to be a private
matter to be settled betHeen prospecto rs and local chiefs.

Its neutrality ,

hol·1ever, was more apparent than real, since the British conquest of Ashanti
md colonizat ion of the country hnd weakened the bargainin g cohesiven ess of
Ghanaians and made it possible for British enterpris e to come freely to
Ghana.

It is now impossibl e to know uhat lvoulC: have happened had there been

no colonizat ion, and therefore , it is e,~ceec1in3ly difficult to analyze the
effects of British colonizat ion on the rapidity with which the gold industry
,-1as developed , and the terns and condition s on l·1hich capital and technolog y

were introduce d into Ghana.

Houever, three points should be noted:

(1) The best gold fields had been discovere d and l·7orked by Africans.

-7Europeans played only a

role in the discovery of the gold mines, ,~hich

SC1cil1

were originally brought to their attention by African middlemen who kneu the
potential of the raines and recognized the need to modernize production.

11

(2) Europeans acquired mineral rights very cheaply since they negotiated
directly with local chiefs 't·1hose bargaining poHer was weak.
have been possible had the Ashanti empire remained intact.
so closely guarded

This would not
The empire had

its source of wealth that no foreigner had been allol1ed

to see a gold mine, and the gold industry was dominated by elite which appro
priated its surplus.

12

(3) Uninhibited free enterprise was e,~traordinarily inefficient in
raising capital for the gold mining industry.

The raad scramble for gold

concessions during the Jungle Boom was stimulated not by careful' rational
evaluation, but by something bordering on hysteria.

This \·1as the age of

Cecil PJ-iodes and J, Rider Hagsarcl, of the White Man's Destiny and the Drear..,
of King SolOQon 's Nines.

The California gold rush was still remembered, and

the discoveries of the South African gold fields were a recent experience.
(The Boer Har helped to divert capital from South Africa to Ghana). Consequent•
ly, the rush for gold uas e:{tremely wasteful, although the burden,
beginning at least, fell mainly on Ilritain and not on Ghana.

in the

13

The returns over the years which the colony obtained by supporting
the gold industry uere ccmparatively small.

The rapid e,cpansion of pro

duction uas short-lived, and it took thirty years, three times the period
predicted by the government,

to produce 10 □ illion ounces.

the industry began to decline,

In the 1920 1 s

There was, houever, a revival in the 1930's,

-8-

when the price of gold rose, which helped to maintain the value of total
exports at a time when the value of cocoa exports had fallen.

Still the

1
industry was not, all in all, a dynamic factor in Ghana s export economy.

More importan t, the returned value to Ghana of the gold industry ( i.e.
the share of output after payment for imported raw materia ls and machine ry
goods,de duction of dividend s and payment of salaries to European official s)
was quite low.

14

Local purchase s were and are insignif icant, and wages paid

to Africans are a small fraction (less than 20%) of total value of output.
Until the 30 1 s income taxes were paid to the British and not to the Ghana
treasury and in the 40's and SO's taxes paid to Ghana were from 10% to 15%
of output.
low.

Tariffs on fuel oil used by the mining industry have been kept

The gold industry has few links with the rest of the economy, and the

spillove r effect is small.

The work is unpleasa nt and dangerou s, and the

maintena nce of an adequate supply of labour depends upon the backward ness and
ignoranc e prevaili ng in the Northern territor ies of Ghana.

The industry

traditio nally used a cheap labour policy; wages were kept low, turnover was
high and little effort was made to develop a skilled labour force.

Profits

not reinvest ed in gold itself are sent back to England and no local decision 
making center was establis hed to search the local environm ent and utilize
capital in new industri es.

In nearly all these respects the gold industry

contrast s sharply with the cocoa industry , \·1here linkages and externa lities
have been high and would have been higher had the gold industry not absorbed
a disprop ortionat e share of the governm ent's help.

-9(b ) The Cocoa Industry

15,

Coco~ not gol~ was the p81e de croissance of the Gold Coast economy.
The industry was developed by Ghanaian capital, Ghanaian enterprise, and
Ghanaian technology, with little help from the colonial government. 16 The
cocoa industry had begun on its own to a considerable extent before 1900 and
was well-developed by 1910.

Only when the industry was past the "take-off"

point did the government begin to pay attention to it and plough back some
of its earning into it.

The contribution of cocoa to the government, in

the form of expanded trade and increased revenue, was completely out of
proportion to the

contribution made to it by the

govern□ ent.

The early public transport system was of little help to cocoa farmers. 17
The administration chose to begin its railroad to Kumasi in the West,
at Sekondi, where it could serve the needs of the gold industry, and neither
in the East \•1here the capital city of Accra was located and where the cocoa
industry was developing, nor in the center at Cape Coast which was the major
port at the time in terms of volume of trade.
part of the eastern route,

Only after 1911 when the first

from Accra to Kumasi, was built did the share of

cocoa exports carried by the railway become significant (see Figure 3 and
18
Table 3).
This link was of great value to Ghanaian development but it
must be emphasized that it t·1as built after the cocoa industry was well past
the take-off point.
In the early years Ghanaian farmers had to develop their own system
of transport by widening roads and building bridges.

Even after the

-10-

railroads were completed, a major part of the journey from the farm to the
port took place by means of a costly head-loading system,
built with little government help or knowledge.

on paths and roads

19

Nor did the government provide any valuable assistance in developing
agricultural techniques for growing cocoa in Ghana.

On the contrary,

its

efforts in this direction were counter-product ive and if its recommendations
had been followed,

the growth of the industry would have been retarded. As

the industry developed, the colonial officers, especially those concerned
i1ith agriculture,
to

11

far from being pleased, tended to deplore the tendencies

over-extension ,"

11

imprudence 11 and the "neglect of other crops.

of applauding the rapid growth of the industry,

11

Instead

they were worried about the

"grave danger of farms being extended beyond what might be reckoned reasonable
limits; "

20

and the "positive danger that irrational development of cocoa

11 21
l
l .
. tacing
.
pace,
is
panting
1

Reports from various parts of the Gold Coast

and the Department of Agriculture continually carried complaints of the small
farmer who did not "fully realize his responsibility,·

11

who only "dimly under

stands the measures he has been advised to adopt, " and who was

1

'more con-

cerned with the money to be made out of his farm than the quality of his
produce,

11

1
The reports repeatedly describe the "dangerous tendencies, '.

"wanton neglect II and

11

dilatory habits II of the African cocoa farmer, and express

the hope that "doubtless experience will teach the cultivator that the most
profitable farm is that which is cultivated by himself and his family-

1122

So strong were the feelings of the Agricultural Officers that some welcomed

-11the sharp fall in the price of cocoa occasioned by the First Horld Har as
they hoped this would halt further expansion.

23

To remedy alleged deficiencies in quality and productive techniques,
the Department of Agriculture wanted to forbid planting when farms were
not kept up to "standards", and to introduce European plantations to demonstrate t h e proper use o f soi· 1 s. 24

But the government was quite mistaken in

its view of what constituted an appropriate technique for planting in Ghana;
to this day no method has been found which is economically superior to that
which was developed by the Ghanaians.

The European plantations, using methods

advocated by the agricultural officers, found themselves unable to compete
with local producers and failed; most of the department I s advice went unheeded
and, fortunately, the department was not given the power to enforce its views.
In objecting to the Ghanaian system the colonial officers were com
mitting two fundamental errors: first, on the technological side, they made
the assumption that Ghanaian techniques were inferior to European ones; they
did no research on local problems· but instead preferred to disseminate im
ported techniques.

The department advocated methods suitable to land-scarce

countries in temperate climates; Ghanaian farmers operated in an environment
where land was plentiful, labour was scarce, and scientific knowledge was
lacking both on the part of the farmers themselves and on the part of the
officers who advised them.

25

To save labour, Ghanaian farmers did no ex-

tensive weeding, cleaning, or care of the land.

It was also common practice

to grow several crops on a given plot of land, partly to maintain the fertility

-12of the soil and partly to provide cover crops which would protect the
cocoa from sunlight.

These practices gave the farms an "unkempt" appearance

which shocked the European agricultural officers who were used to European
methods.

The agricultural officers were particularly distressed by what

they thought was a lack of proper disease control because it was a practise
of Ghanaians to allow a diseased farm to lie fallow rather than try to elim
inate the disease.

This worked reasonably well, as the department's officers

noted, since the farms usually recovered by themselves, but they still felt
it was not in accord with

11

sound 11 agricultural principles.

However, no

superior method was known.
The second fundamental error of the colonial officers was in their
economic analysis.

They did not understand the capitalist nature of cocoa

production which they continually referred to as peasant agriculture.

They

failed to see the drive to accumulate farms as the main dynamic force in
the industry.

To the Department of Agriculture the development of cocoa

was a result of nature ("the local conditions of soil and climate are peculiar
ly favourable"), not human skill ("no ingenuity and a minimum of exertion is
required 11 )

26

and there ,-1as no "argument against the fact that the system is

wasteful in the extreme":
"The cost of establishing ne,·1 cocoa crops is nil since
they are obliged to use fresh forest land for food.
Cocoa is planted amongst food. Food is taken for a
few years and then land given to cocoa. This means
that the farmer has several farms and as labour is by
no means abundant and the majority of the farmers can
not or will not employ sufficient labour to help them
to keep the farms in 2 9rder, they become neglected and
disease comes over."

-13-

But Polly Hill has shown that it was neither easy nor costless to establish
a cocoa farm and it was precisely the desire of certain Ghanaian cocoa
farmers "to plant far more than he and his family can look after 1128 and to
hire labour that accounted for the rapid growth of the industry.

Though

there are numerous small cocoa farmers in Ghana who work only their own
land and sell only the cocoa produced by their family, and who might be
called peasants, the major part of the cocoa crop and the major credit for
establishing the industry sterns from a much smaller group of cocoa farmers
who expanded their operations beyond the family farm by buying extra land and
employing outside labour and who, as Polly Hill stresses, should properly
be called rural capitalists.

Had the expansion of the cocoa industry de

pended simply on large numbers of individual proprietors switching from
other crops to cocoa, the rate of growth would have been much slower than it
was.

The successful farmer, by accumulating wealth, evolved from a peasant

to a rural capitalist, managing farms in several areas at different stages
of development, supervising labour and investing in land to satisfy his
future needs.

This system led to a rapid rate of growth because it used

the labour of large numbers of Ghanaians who lacked starting capital of their
own, as well as the labour of migrants from the French territories to the
north of Ghana.
The accumulation of capital in cocoa also helped start other industries
as successful farmers invested in other business or lent money to others.
The concentration of capital in the hands of the more enterprising (and lucky)

-14individua ls who then spread out into new industrie s is a fundament al
feature of the growth process in free enterpris e economies .
was slowed down

by the colonial governme nt's tendency to neglect, and

frustrate , the developme nt of Ghanaian capitalis ts.

II, 1920 - 1945

In Ghana it

29

30

The Guggisber g period (1920-30) was in many ways the finest hour of
British colonial administr ation in the Gold Coast.

Sir Gordon Guggisber g,

His Ten Year Developme nt Plan was atypicall y well
31
conceived , and based on a highly articulate d strategy of developme nt.

was an exception al man.

In 1919, when Guggisber g took office, the colony had just experienc ed
twenty years of extraordi nary growth, interrupte d only briefly by Horld Uar
One.

The country was prosperou s, and the governmen t, thanks to its large

revenues from cocoa, was financial ly sound with a good credit rating in
London.

Guggisber g's aim was to secure the economic structure built in the

first quarter of the century and to provide a more solid foundatio n for
.
• h -stand ing any f uture a dvers1ty.
wit

32

The economic principle s behind the developme nt plan were the following :
(a)

Long-run economic growth and developme nt of the colony would
require a large expenditu re by the governmen t on health, education ,
and other forms of what we call human capital formation .

(b)

The governme nt's resources , though substanti al at the time, ,-1ere
small in relation to the country's needs, and the first priority
was to raise its revenues.

-15(c)

The bulk of the plan was, therefore, to be devoted initially to
improving infrastructure in order to increase exports and thereby
augment government revenue and overall prosperity.

(d)

To prepare for the time when more ample resources would be avail
able, a beginning was to be made on a new program of education and
health.

Major efforts were to be postponed until the second stage

of the plan, when it was hoped that increased revenue would be
available.
Guggisberg stated these principles succinctly:
"For progress we must have education; for education of the
right type we must have a bigger revenue. To get bigger
revenue we raust have bigger trade, and to get bigger trade
we must have more agriculture and far better systems of
transportation than at present exist. 11 33
In practice, the Guggisberg plan faced several obstacles and was never
fully implemented.

In the first place the shortages of skilled labour held

up the construction of infrastructure.

Thus the failures of the government

in technical training in the previous decades proved a check on its ability
to expand in the 1920 's.

34

Equally serious was the financial constraint; the

raising of revenue for the plan was a matter of great concern, and Guggisberg
had to contend with severe criticism from government officials and from the
mercantile community.
.
) 35
ment expen d iture.

(The_Ghanaian sector, however, pressed for more govern
Still, Guggisberg was able to accomplish a great deal,

and the 1920's saw a major expansion of infrastructure and an important begin
ning in providing more adequate education and health services to Ghanaians.

-16The achievem ents of Guggisb erg are symboliz ed by three names: Takoradi ,
the new deep-wa ter port, AchiQota , a first-ra te secondar y school which
became the cornerst one of higher educatio n in Ghana and the training ground
for many of the country 's future teachers and politica l leaders, and Korle Bu,
the new modern hospita l built in Accra for Ghanaian s.

But in a sense these

accompl ishments were the trapping s of economic growth and not the foundati on.
The physica l hardware of the country expanded , but not the ability to use
resource s efficien tly or to cope with the exigenc ies of a changing world.
Guggisb erg 's great leap forward was followed not by the developm ent
he expected but by stagnati on and retrench ment.

Exports failed to rise,

1
and indeed fell in real value, as a result of falling prices in the 1930 s

and rising import prices in the 1940 's.

New industri es failed to appear.

The plan itself was never complet ely fulfille d through lack of revenue but
was cut short in the late 20's.

In the 1930 1 s even current expendi ture had

to be retrench ed and during the Second HorldH ar imports fell to an un
preceden ted low level.
There is a certain irony in the events of this period.

The plan was

conceive d and executed by foreigne rs who assumed that the best interest s
of Ghana required it to become integrat ed into the world economy and "more
and more one cog in tt:he world economic machine.

1.1'

11 "'"'

Their efforts were

directed at turning the Ghanaian economy outward ; but as they did so, the
world economy collapse d and the Ghanaian economy faltered with it.

Their

crucial mistake was not that they exaggera ted Ghana's potentia l (they ser-

-17iously underestimated it) but that they misjudged the potentiality of the
37
' · h tra d 1ng
Br1t1s
·
k
networ.

The depression of the 1930's illustrated that the British trading neti-ork was unable to achieve international co-operation even within its own
domain.

If the United Kingdom had chosen to expand, rather than contract,

during the depression, by increasing investment in the colonies, it could
have solved both its own problem of employment and the colonies' problem of
growth.

However,

it was not organized to take the necessary steps, and

merely transmitted the full impact of its crisis to its empire.

The British

economic system was not adaptive; it resembled a man who stands irresolutely
before a barrier instead of trying to find a way round it.
It is interesting to note that the failure of the Guggisberg plan did
not result in a political upheaval in Ghana.
boycott,

There were crises (the cocoa

for example), but political control was maintained throughout the

depression and during the great stresses of the war.

It was the genius of

the British colonial system, as a system for maintaining political power, to
38
. . b y d oing
.
h'
react to a cr1s1s
noting.

The failure of the international economy was not the only fault in
Guggisberg's strategy; his plan itself was seriously deficient.

The health

program was an important breakthrough, but still a meagre achievement in the
light of the very low health and nutrition standards in the country and
the resulting drain on productivity. 39

The education program was heavily

biased towards elitism and failed to provide the kind of scientific and economic
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training necessary for development .
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More important, the agricultura l

and transportati on programs were fraught with error.

These must be dis

cussed in greater detail.
(a)

Agriculture .
Diversifica tion was the major theme of agricultura l policy in the

Guggisberg period.

In part, the decision not to encourage cocoa was

based on the feeling that the country could not safely expand cocoa pro-

41
.
duction.

The major reason for encouraging other crops was that world

demand for cocoa was unpredictab le and it was thought to be a better policy
not to have all of the colony's eggs in one basket.

The basis for this

concern was reasonable, but the conclusion that Ghana should diversify into
other tropical export products, does not follow from it.

In the first

place, one would have to know the cost of growing other crops.

The experience

of Ghanaian cocoa farmers gave Ghana a special advantage in cocoa production
not easily transferable to other crops.

A thousand pounds spent on improving

cocoa production might well have had a higher pay-off than a thousand pounds
spent on other crops, even with the assumption that the price of cocoa might
fall.

In the second place, it is not clear that diversifica tion would im

prove stability.

The suggested alternative crops faced much the same future

as cocoa, since the trends and cycles in demand for various tropical agricul
tural products share many common causal factors and tend to be highly correlated.
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Better solutions were av~ilabl~ but were not tried because they

involved instruments beyond the pale of British colonial political economy.

-19For example, one possible solution to the problem of a declining cocoa
price might have been to form a cartel with other African producers (and
perhaps Brazil) to control supply, and to promote the demand for chocolate
by advertising and other devices.

These instruments of market control,

in common use by private corporations (including the expatriate merchants
and shippers operating in Hest Africa)

were not, however, part of colonial

political economy; neither was an industrialization policy to increase the
range of goods produced in Ghana.

Both of these measures were advocated

by Ghanaians in representations to the government but were never seriously
considered.
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Another creative alternative would have been to promote specialization
throughout the empire in order to increase productivity and to lower costs;
this would have been highly risky for any individual colony, but not
for the empire as a ,~hole.

The solution to the problems of uncertainty

and instability that is most compatible with growth is an insurance scheme
which encourages specialization by protecting the specialized sub-components
of the economy against the risk of price declines.

One such device is the

federal budget, which redistributes income in the economy in such a way
as to make sure that no sector suffers too greatly from participating in
a wider system of division of labour.

To achieve this type of harmonization,

political co-operation among the specialized units is necessar~ and it was
precisely this advantage that the British had at their disposal in the
imperial system.

They could have used their political power to achieve diver-
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sification on an imperial scale while assuring security to each participant.
Ironically, however, the main potential advantage of the British imperial
trading system was never utilized.

The empire remained decentralized, no

attempt at co-ordinated specialization was made, and each colony was re
sponsible mainly for itself.

In addition, colonial administrators encouraged

diversification, with some curious results; in the Gold Coast,

for example,

the government attempted to curtail the production of cocoa as we have shown,
and encouraged the production of rubber in its place, while in Malaya the
British administration attempted to expand the production of cocoa.

In

their attempt to ensure diversified sources of supply to the mother country,
the British sacrificed the opportunity to increase the size of the total
income and welfare of the commonwealth.
It is of great importance to stress that the strategy of diversifica
tion pursued in the twenties was not concerned merely with introducing new
crops, but also emphasized changing the mode of production.

The new strategy

-was not designed to help the emerging cocoa capitalists to diversify into
new crops or new industries; it tried instead to replace the Ghanaian system
with plantation agriculture.

The attempt failed miserably, as had earlier

attempts from 1900 to 1920, for none of the new plantations or new forms
of capital ever got beyond the infant entrepreneurial stage.
The Department of Agriculture had always believed in the need to in
troduce estate agriculture into Ghana, and their development attempts of
the 1920's must be viewed in the light of their previous efforts to attract

-21European capital to Gold Coast agriculture.

A number of Europeans did in

fact come to the Gold Coast from about 1906 onwards, and they acquired
concessions of land on which to establish plantation agriculture; but these
ventures were not in fact successful and encountered numerous difficulties
in paying the going wage and producing at a cost below the going price. By
1920, the Department of Agriculture reported that

11

al1 European plantation

companies established in the colony have in the meantime suspended operations
due to low price.

11

By and large this ended the experiment in European

agriculture, though a very few plantations lingered on.
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The colonial administration, having failed to attract foreign capital
ists, and being wholly negative in its attitude to Ghanaian capitalists,
set out to establish plantations of its own.
to

l-Jhile Guggisberg told Ghanaians

Make Your Farms Smaller", the Agricultural Department devcted most of

11

its efforts to establishing large-scale agriculture.

Despite the optimism

and considerable expenditure of the Agriculture Department,

its ventures in

coconut and sisal failed to fulfill its objectives, as did the attempt to
build a rice mill, to subsidize a palm oil mill, and to develop sugar, shea
nuts and cotton.

Meanwhile, it neglected research, and its legacy in terms

of scientific knowledge was almost nil.

45

Lastly, we might briefly note the government's attitude to the continuous
conflict between the farmer and the merchant to whom he sold his cocoa. The
farmers suspected they were at a disadvantage in their bargaining, as indeed
they were, because the number of buyers were few and they frequently colluded

-22The main bargaining instrument

to keep the terms of trade in their favour.

used by the Ghanaian cocoa farmer to counteract the oligopolist powers of
the foreign merchant companies was the holdup or the boycott.

Periodically,

the farmers would withhold the sale of their cocoa when they felt the price
was low; this occurred a number of .times over the years.

The government's

policy was to discourage these boycotts since they interfered with trade;
however they took no steps to counteract the oligopolist collusion of
expatriate firms, but in fact reinforced it by diverting attention away
from the larger expatriate firms, and towards the small middlemen, who,
they argued, were responsible for the difficulties.
which they fostered,

The cooperative movement

instead of tackling the monopoly problem, wasted its

time on the spurious issue of the quality of cocoa.

Hhen the government

established a marketing agency during the Second World War, it kept the
price of cocoa low and gave the force of law to the collusive market-sharing
agreement of the expatriate firms (since shares were alloted to firms on
the basis of past performance).
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(b) Transportation.
Transportation was to Guggisberg "without any doubt whatever, by far
the most important subject in this country,
meant railways.

11

and by transportation, Guggisberg

"Hith more railways we shall be safe for all time - without

1147
them our future is not only imperilled: it is doomed,

The major items

of expenditure in the development program of the 1920's was the improvement
and expansion of the railway and the construction of a deep-water harbour at
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its terminus in the western part of the country.
There is no doubt that a deep-water harbour was badly needed; Ghana
does not have a natural harbour and the artificial one at Takoradi, opened
in 1926, allowed ships to dock on Ghana's coast for the first time. Pre
viousl~ they had to anchor a safe ~istance from the shore, the goods being
brought ashore by small surf-boats and head-loading.

This system relied

heavily on human energy, and was costly and was_teful, particularly when
heavy cargo was involved.

The new harbour made it easier to unload heavy

machiner~ and to load bulky commodities.

But by chasing Takoradi as the

site for the harbour rather than Accra, Guggisberg re-infused the Western bias
of the transport system and greatly reduced the productivity of his very
large expenditure on infrastructure.

Takoradi was crucial to the manganese

industry, - (a low-value high bulk commodity) - but since the returned value
to the community from this industry is low, the social productivity of the
harbour has been much less than is indicated by the tonnage figures or by
the value of exports.

Takoradi's contribution to the cocoa industry was

more limited; much cocoa continued to be shipped from Accra using the surf
boat system and a large amount of the imported goods destined for cocoa
farmers continued to come through Accra .. It was only when Terna Harbour was
opened in 1962 that the eastern part of the country was provided with a
modern form of unloading.
This was not what Guggisberg planned.

By building the Central Province

Railway which extended eastward from Takoradi, he hoped to reach the central

-24as mining needs.
part of the countr y and thus to serve agricu ltural as well
inhabi ted
In fact, the Centra l Provin ce Railro ad went throug h sparse ly
region s with few comme rcial crops.

It failed to genera te traffi c since

south and to
Ghanai an produc ers found it cheape r to send their produc ts
via the long
load them by surf-b oat at Cape Coast and Saltpo nd rather than
route by train to Takora di.
of trans
Guggis berg made a second mistak e with regard to the proble m
ance of the lorry.
portat ion in the countr y; he failed to apprec iate the import
uction of
The world- wide revolu tion in transp ort occasi oned by the introd
uced the
motor vehicl es spread quickl y to Ghana as the Ford truck introd
"age of the lorry" .

Africa n busine ssmen quickl y graspe d the possi bilitie s

indust ry grew
of the new techno logica l innova tion and the road transp ort
with amazin g rapidi ty.

The flexib ility of motor transp ort, its abilit y to

it a revolu tion
penetr ate deeply and to create an elabor ate set of links made
ary force.

The growin g volume of motor transp ort and the spread of the

obtain better
net\·10rk throug hout the countr y enable d outlyi ng farmer s to
food.
prices and extend ed the margin of cultiv ation of cocoa and

Villag es

profit able.
eagerl y awaite d roads \~hich would make comme rcial agricu lture

49

the crucia l
Road transp ort quickl y cut into railwa y revenu e and led to
of cocoa,
road vs. rail disput e. (Table 3 and Figure 3 show how the volume
carrie d by the railroa d,

fell as the Guggis berg plan reache d fulfill ment. )

a blessi ng but a
To the colon ial admin istrati on, the new techno logy was not
ced vie\·1 of the
proble m threat ening their plans and they took a very jaundi
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11

unfair 11 competition between state enterprise and Ghanaian enterprise.
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As they saw it, the problem stemmed not from their own errors but from the
inadequate organization of the Ghanaian sector.

Railroads,

in their view,

were properly organized and had a good pedigree because of their strategic
role in 19th-century development; motor transport,
by Ghanaians without a proper system.

in contrast, was run

51

This conflict between roads and rails shows the defects and biases
in government planning.

Given the railway, the appropriate economic policy

was to set railroad prices equal to marginal cost and to subsidize the
deficit out of general revenue.

However, the colonial government aimed at

covering the railways' operating expenses from its operating revenue and
hence it charged what the tariff would bear. It decided, without analysis,
that manganese and gold could only bear low rates and that cocoa could bear
. h rates. 52
I11.g

(Table 4 and Figure 4 indicates that cocoa rates were raised

in order to maintain revenue.)

This was only possible where cocoa had no

alternative form of transportation, such as Ashanti.

In other places,

high prices charged to cocoa by the railway in order to recoup the losses
suffered because of the low prices charged to mining, drove cocoa traffic
on to the road.

53

Various methods were considered to protect the new infrastructure from
the "force of competition from motor lorries and cheaper ports" including
increased licence fees for motor lorries, the periodic closing of

certain

roads to heavy traffic, taxation of heavy traffic on roads competing with

-26closing
railway s, licensi ng of routes, the establi shment of toll gates, the
g
of certain ports, the enforce ment of regulat ions on safety and carryin
motor
capaci ty to avoid the "persis tent overloa ding" which "allowe d" the
lorries to "charge low rates."

A full account of all the steps taken and

their impact is not availab le.

However,

in 1934, the Carriag e of Goods

led
Road Ordinan ce prohib ited the carriag e of specifi ed goods over schedu
roads.

54

Equally importa nt,

road constru ction was held back in the 1930 's

so
and "gaps were delibe rately left in the system of road commun ications
· h t h e rai· 1way.
·
wit
as to preven t compet·ition

1155

Other steps which directl y

were
or indirec tly, delibe rately or otherwi se, restric ted road transpo rt
during
the strict control of the import ation of vehicle s, tires, and petrol
l
the Second World War, and the policy of the West African Produce Contro
ng
Board of paying the same price for cocoa at all rail-po ints, thus absorbi
coast.
freight costs and removin g the inducem ent to send it by road to the
In summary, the inabili ty of the author ities to co-ord inate roads and
rail illustr ates the inadequ acy of colonia l plannin g.

The admini strator s

they
concen trated on certain facets of the problem and neglect ed others;
lacked the instrum ents and the inform ation needed to make approp riate
decisio ns.

Given the crucia l role of transpo rt in develop ment, their errors

had the most serious consequ ences.
. pended upon the motor lorry.

Interna l exchang e of local produce de-

By slowing down the expansi on of the road

ed
network in order to divert cocoa to the railroa d,. the governm ent inhibit
closed
the develop ment of regiona l specia lizatio n and exchang e of food, and

-27-

off business opportunities for Ghanaians in cocoa, transport, distribution
and food.

56

The neglect of internal trade provides one of the most serious in
dictments of colonial political economy.

Its glaring symbol is the

northern part of the country where for many reasons Ghanaians were unable
to create economic growth by themselves and the state did little to help
them,
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The climate of the North differs sharply from that of the South

and there is a natural basis for division of labour in agriculture.

For

example, the North could produce cattle and cereals for the South in return
for its forest and sea products.

But when proposals were made to build a

railroad to the North, the discussion was conducted almost entirely in
terms of the possibilities of promoting export crops - e.g. shea nuts and
groundnuts - and not the stimulation of trade between the North and the
South.

Moreover a railroad is not required, since the terrain is ideally

suited for roads.

Furthermore, much more than transportation would have

been needed since increased production in the North required irrigation,
disease control, and agricultural research.

Colonial policy, however, gave

the North less than a proportionate share of infrastructure, education,
health and agricultural research, even though its needs were greatest.
The colonial government thus ignored the opportunity to promote trade with
in Ghana.

The North remained the most backward and impoverished region in

the country with the lowest educational standards and the most serious
problems of malnutrition and disease - a testament to the uneven development

. 1·ism. 58
promoted under colonia
In 1930, a conference was held in the Gold Coast, "to find out if
· 11 y soun d • ,iS 9
a country run by peasant farmers was economica

It would

have been more relevant to ask whether a country run by British coloniza
tionalists was economically sound.

III, 1945-1962.

The years after 1945 were ones of rapid and continuous change.

The

depression revealed the inadequacies of the colonial system and World Har
II weakened Great Britain's ability to control the empire.
was needed.

A new strategy

Before- we discuss it we may briefly summarize the main con

clusions that emerge from our condensed and simplified examination of British
colonial policy and its effects in Ghana between 1900 and 1939.
1.

60

Foreign investment proved to be a poor engine of growth.

Although foreign investment was encouraged, its contribution to the economy
was very limited.
2.

The major dynamics for growth came from the African sector

of the economy and it achieved its success with little help from the
government or from foreign capital.
3.

Despite the great success of the African sector in establish

ing Ghana as the leading producer of cocoa in the world and successfully
maintaining its share in the face of competition from equally fertile areas
elsewhere (including some in which cocoa is grown on a European plantation
basis), African businessmen were not able to diversify into manufacturing
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or large scale modern farming.

Ghana remained a nation of small farmers

· na 1· mar k et.
·
. . h e d pro d uc t son t h e internatio
.
un f inis
an d tra d ers se 11 ing
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The internatio nal economy proved highly unreliabl e and unstable
62
as a foundatio n on which to build the economy.
4.

5.

The productiv ity of.the governmen t sector was low.

It made

important errors in planning the transport system; it failed to do adequate
research; it underestim ated the strengths and needs of the Ghanaian sector;
and it overstres sed the importanc e of foreign trade and foreign capital. The
Governmen t created linkages with the mother country, but decreased linkages
with neighbour ing African countries, and failed to improve internal link
ages within the econom~
6.

The governmen t also proved to be rigid and inflexibl e rather

than enterpris ing.

It was one-dimen sional in outlook and because of its

hegemonic position was able to exclude many reasonabl e policy alternativ es.
It was a reluctant and gradual modernize r, bringing some of the benefits
of the industria l revolutio n to Ghana, but also using Ghana as an outlet
for the tensions and problems of British society.

Contrary to what is often

claimed, only limited credit can be given to the British colonial adminis
tration for opening up the country, but when it departed in 1957, it left
behind a meage heritage.
1. Developme nt Planning from the Gold Coast
to Ghana.
The main ingredien t of the post depressio n strategy to deal with the
tensions of the colonial eA~ort economy was an expansion of the governmen t

-30sector under the rubric of develo pment planni ng.
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In part this involv ed

growin g pressu res
an expans ion of social and commu nity servic es to satisf y the
an expans ion of
for health , educa tion, and urban izatio n; in part it involv ed
rise in the
infras tructu re to provid e suppo rt servic es for privat e enterp
produ ctive sector of the economy.
ms
In the first round, the Britis h tried to introd uce the new progra
within the colon ial struct ure.

As a result of the politi cal uprisi ngs in

admin istrati on
the 30 1 s, London in 1940-4 1, sent a circul ar to each colon ial
connec tion with
asking it to prepar e a plan of develo pment for the colony in
funds availa ble from the Colon ial Develo pment and Welfar e Act.

The result

callin g for an
in Ghana was the Ten Year Develo pment Plan publis hed in 1946
64
About one-th ird of the plan
expen diture of a little over a millio n pounds .
grants , anothe r
was to be financ ed throug h Colon ial Develo pment and Welfar e
out of surplu s
third from borrow ings in the London marke t, and the remain der
balanc es.

With hindsi ght the plan appear s

overly modes t, but it contai ned

came later.
a large number of the projec ts used in the larger plans that
ed by
This initia l foray into develo pment planni ng was quickl y outpac
the course of events .

Mass dissat isfact ion among the young, couple d with the

proble m of postwa r inflat ion

and unempl oyment among return ing vetera ns, led

proces s of
to the boyco tts and riots of 1948 and compl etely upset the slow
65 A new plan,
politi cal develo pment planne d by the colon ial admin istrati on.
decade of the
seven times as large (in money terms ), was -prepar ed for the
of govern ment.
fiftie s and introd uced in 1951, just before Nkrumah became leader
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Even this estimate, however, turned out to be conservative; the plan was completed in five years instead of ten,

66

yet so great were the funds at the

disposal of the government that at independence, in 1957, the government
still had international reserves of about 250 million pounds with which to
continue the expansion of infrastructure and basic services.

Over the years

1950-1965, the government spent a total of about one billion pounds (an
annual average of 200 million dollars or 30 dollars per head) a level unpre
cedented in Ghana's history and far higher per capita than has been or will
be possible in most African countries.

The Government of Nigeria, for example,

during the same period was able to spend only about 2 billion pounds, or less
than 10 dollars per head annually.
This large expansion of the government was only possible because of
the crucial fiscal policy decision taken in the early 1950's by the colonial
administration.

When the' price of cocoa rose in the world market after 1945

and especially between 1950 and 1954, the government had to choose an appropriate
way of sharing the windfall.

The bounty in foreign exchange could have been

given to the private sector if the government had lowered tax rates or raised
the price it paid cocoa producers to the level of prices prevailing in the
world market.

Instead, the government appropriated for its own use a large

share of the increased income; the policy was justified in part as an antiinflationary measure.

67

It was argued that imports could not be increased

because of inadequate tr·ansportation and harbour facilities, and that if truces
were not raised the high level of aggregate demand acting on the inelastic
supply of imports would lead to a rise in prices.

It was assumed that the cocoa
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farmer would not save, and therefore wealth would accumulate in the distribu
tion sector - a large part of which was foreign.

To avoid the inflationary

pressure and mal-distrib ution of income, the government accumulated the windfall
itself and investee the funds in Britain.
The argument used to defend the policy, it should be noted, rested on
a lack of confidence in the Ghanaian middle class.

It assumed that Ghanaian

farmers and traders would fail to recognize the transient nature of the rise
in income and prices and that all the gains would go to foreigners.

A con

trary view held that at least some Ghanaians would have taken advantage of
boom conditions and that capital would have accumulated in the hands of these
enterprisin g Ghanaians.

This would have laid the basis for an entrepreneu rial

class.

Whatever the merits of the case, this avenue of development was not

opened.

The British colonial administrat ion captured the windfall for the

government sector, in one blow sealing the fate of the Ghanaian middle class,
providing the British government with a large low-cost dollar loan during the
68 and setting the stage for Nkrumah's socialist strategy. 69
fifties,
The results of the massive expansion by the government were not those
70
hoped for. Income did not grow proportiona tely to capital formation , and
the economy, which had appeared buoyant durin~ the 1950's, seemed suddenly,
a few short years after independenc e, to transform itself into a state of
stagnation, punctuated by crises.

Within a short time the political system

erected by the British crumbled, and the country's economic difficultie s
increased until they reached crisis proportions .
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The government was in a state of continuous deficit, international reserves
were depleted with time ai;d an alarming foreign debt accumulated; imports
were restricted; prices rose sharply, black markets appeared, and parts of the
capital stock were :orced into idleness as production in some industries came
to a standstill.

Early in 1966 the military, declaring that "the economic

situation of the country is in such a chaotic condition that unless something
is done about it now the whole economic system will collapse. 1171 overthrew
72
Nkrumah and brought to an end his particular experiment in development strategy.
So great was the imprint of Kwame Nkrumah on Ghana's development policy
that it is all too easy to attribute Ghana's economic difficulties to the
II

unrealistic, stubborn one man rule that has mismanaged and squandered the

nations's resources. 1173

Until independence, Nkrumah had closely followed

traditional colonial development strategy, and the major government programs
were planned and implemented by a civil service still largely staffed by British
.colonial administrators.

The premise of these programs was that the government

was building a framework to attract foreign capital and mobilize local capital.
The state provided infrastructure and other "support" services needed by the
private sector, while the task of providing final goods for consumption, in
vestment, or export was left to private enterprise.

By improving roads, rail

ways and harbours, expanding health and educational services, and providing
agricultural extension and other such services, the government hoped to
stimulate the private sector to expand and diversify exports and to produce

74
new goods for local consumption and investment.
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This strat~g y changed after indepen dence and especi ally after 1961.
A new strateg y was initiat ed based on the large scale entry of the state
into the produc tive sector .

Its premise was that Ghanaia n busines smen were

efficie nt,
not capable of the task of modern ization , and that it was therefo re more
the state
as well as more desirab le on genera l social ist princip les, to rely on
sector rather than the private sector as the major engine of growth .

As

among
Nkrumah put it, "colon ial rule preclud ed that accumu lation of capita l
in
our citizen s which would have assiste d thoroug h-going private investm ent
indust rial constru ction.

It has therefo re been left to the governm ent, as

the
the holder of the means, to play the role of main entrepr eneur in laying
1176 A large role was
basis of the nation al econom ic and social advance ment.
in part
still alloted to foreign capita l from both the West and the East, but
preclud e
nership with the state sector , not with private enterp rises (so as to
foreign
the formati on of a local private sector allied with, and depend ent upon,
capita l).

Particu lar emphas is was placed on co-ope ration between the state

,
and the very large foreign corpor ations, such as Kaiser , Parkins on Howard
and Unilev er along the lines establi shed in the Volta River Projec t.

Since

expand ,
there were definit e limits on the speed with which the governm ent could
a transit ion period was envisag ed, involvi ng the co-exis tence of the public
and private sectors .

The state sector was to come to the fore, not through

nation alizati on, but through more rapid growth.
The governm ent, after 1961, also inaugu rated new systems of plannin g
modern ize
and contro l, and began an all-ou t effort to develop manufa cturing , to
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agriculture, and to change the direction of trade away from Great Britain
towards other countries, particularly those of the socialist world.

The

private Ghanaian sector was no longer encouraged to enter medium and large
scale manufacturing:, instead, a number of state enterprises were created in
industry, mining distribution, and shipping to act as a "control" on foreign
Similarly,

firms and to stimulate the growth of Ghanaian industrialization.

in agriculture, a major emphasis was placed on state farms, youth farms, co
operatives, etc., as vehicles for modernization and mechanization.
It was because of this change in strategy that Nkrumah was blamed for
the "sorry plight of the country that began independence from Britain in 1957
with large financial reserves, abundant resources and the brightest prospects
.
nat.ion. 1177
o f any new Af rican

Critics of the state enterprise approach

argued that Nkrumah's new policies frustrated Ghanaian businessmen and frightened
away foreign capital, thus killing the goose that laid the golden egg.

They

felt that private capital, local and foreign, had far more potential than
Nkrumah allowed for.

We shall not try to evaluate the strength and weaknesses

of Nkrumah's strategy of primary reliance on the state sector here.
issues are too current and too complex to allow brief summary.

The

What we shall

try to do instead is to set straight certain key elements of the period and
to clear up some of the confusion surrounding Nkrumah's experiment.

We

merely wish to point out the obvious fact that there is a long gestation period
between action and effect, and that many of the troubles during the second
round were due to mistaken policies of the first round, just as the performance
of the economy after Nkrumah is and will in large part be determined by what

-36was done under his leadership. 78
2. Stabilizatio n Policy
The cycle of expansion and contraction after the Second World War can
usefully be viewed in terms of the following simple relationship which emphasizes
the import constraint on economic growth:

Y = 1-

m

(X + F)

where Y is national income, 1 is e,q;iorts, F is foreign borrowing and m is
the average propensity to import.

The equation simply states that for income

to grow, one of three things must happen: the propensity to import must fall,
exports must grow, or foreign borrowing must increase.

The stylized facts of

Ghana's post-war experience are that the propensity to import did not fall
significant ly, if at all, from 1950 to 1965, while the value of exports, which
grew rapidly between 1945 to 1954, stagnated thereafter and in 1965 stood at
its 1954 level. (Table 2).

In other words, the economy failed during this

period to create new industries, or to expand its export earnings. 79 Major
growth took place in the production of traditional exports; but the virtual
doubling of the quantity exported between 1950 and 1964 was offset by a fall
in the terms of trade, and the value of exports remained unchanged.
The path of income deviated significant ly from the path of exports as
a result of the government' s counter-cyc lical policy.

The government ran

surpluses from 1950 to 1954, and deficits from 1960 on. (Table 5 and Figure

5).

Thus F was large and negative in the initial period, dwindled to zero, and be
came large and positive in the later period.

Imports therefore rose steadily

-37through the 1950's and reached their turning point only after 1960.

The

government's counter-cyclical policy to some extent confused the underlying
trends in the economy and made it appear that the economic difficulties began
after 1960, whereas, in fact, the trouble began in 1954.

The rapid expansion

of the government sector during the 1950's created an atmosphere of dynamism
and progress that was in a sense unrealistic.

The government stretched a

four-year boom (1950-1954) in cocoa prices out to a ten-year boom, but the
development thrust did not prepare the economy for the fall in cocoa prices and
was instead the prelude to a crisis.

The growth of the national income and

the seeming prosperity reflected the multiplier effect of the growth in govern
ment spending, and not an increase in the productive capacity of the economy.
In fact, much of the capital formation of the period had low productivity, at
least in the short run.
By 1961 the shortcomings of the "decade of development" were evident.
The government was running a continuous deficit, exports were stagnating,
international reserves were falling, and little progress had been made towards
the introduction of new economic activities or new methods.

One possible

approach to the problem would have been to trim down the state sector and to
allow the private sector more room for manoeuvering and more funds for expansion.
Nkrumah chose to move in the opposite direction.

Instead of retrenching, he

plunged ahead, creating new instruments of planning and control, and initiating
numerous state enterprises.

This further squeezed the private sector and

strained the economy as a whole.

To critics, even those who agreed with

Nkrumah's emphasis on the state sector, the initiation of ambitious new programs
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In the early 1950 's, it had been poss ible for

down the pric e paid to coco a
to incre ase its reven ue enorm ously by hold ing
gh not with out its diff icul ties)
farm ers. This was poli tica lly feas ible (thou
was expa nding and it was
beca use at that time the gros s natio nal prod uct
1
s, the economy was stag natin g,
poss ible for every one to bene fit. In the 1960
d secto rs had to take plac e
and the incre ase of the gove rnme nt and asso ciate
r secto rs of the community. In
at the price of a decl ine in stand ards for othe
tion were inef fecti vely admi n
addi tion, and pred ictab ly, the new form s of taxa
than incre ased reven ue.
ister ed, and at time s actu ally redu ced rath er
to incre ase pers onal income
In shor t, ther e was grea t poli tica l pres sure
mptio n in the 1950 's crea ted
and not to redu ce it. The expa nsion of consu
ctati ons woul d only be fulf illed
expe ctati ons that it woul d cont inue . Thes e expe
pay- off or if the gove rnme nt
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For a time, the

governm ent was given a certain amount of room to manoeuv er by the accumul ated
foreign exchange reserves that had resulted from the very conserv ative
monetary and fiscal policy of the colonial adminis tration of earlier years.
It was also able to borrow consider ably abroad, though much was in the form
of supplie rs' credit, carrying high interest charges and short repayme nt
periods.

These sources were quickly used up; by 1965 the foreign exchange

reserves were depleted , and the sums needed to repay the debts stood at
alarming heights.
To meet the balance of payments problem, the governm ent made the crucial
mistake of institut ing a system of import quotas while still running the deficits
which stimulat ed purchasi ng power in the economy.

The predicta ble results

of this attempt to keep supply constan t, while shifting demand outward s, were
shortage s and price increase s.

The governm ent then responde d by institut ing

a system of price controls , while continui ng to run deficits .

It thus continue d

to generate demand pressure while trying to prevent an increase in prices.
Leaving aside the fact that both import and price controls were adminis tered
ineffici ently through lack of experien ce, the situatio n was impossi ble, bound
to break do1m eventua lly.

Black markets , corrupti on and an erosion of the

import control system were the result.

82

Clearly , there was no way of closing

the deficit in the balance of payments without closing the deficit in the
governm ent account.

It was the failure to realise this fact, more than anything

1
else, that led to the great wastes and failures of the 1960 s and the end of

the new strategy .
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IV.
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Given

-41-

First, the economy may collapse and alternate between civil war and
military dictatorship.
Secondly, and more hopefully, it may be possible to create a viable
Though Ghana has many financial problems, its

economy on the present base.

"real" base is very sound, and if its international financial problems can
be resolved, there is considerable potential for growth.

It has a relatively

well-developed infrastructure and a well-trained and educated labour force.
The cocoa industry still provides a strong underpinning, and the Volta Dam
complex forms a growinr, point for industrial development.

With foreign aid

and investment and an outward-looking policy, Ghana could probably develop
into a thriving "model" economy.
the coastal regions.

Development, however, would be largely in

Even under very optimistic projections, the modern

sector could not absorb the increases in population, and the majority of the
population would be excluded.

A growing dualism within the country, and

between Ghana and her neighbours would develop.
A third alternative would be an attempt to develop the economy as a
whole.

This would require the mobilization of the entire population, and the

direction of a high proportion of effort to the rural areas and to the bottom
two thirds of urban society.

83

Throughout Ghana's history the rural areas have

provided the surplus for the mostly unproductive efforts of the government and
urban sector.

Considerable reserves of energy still exist in the population

at large, which could be mobilized for increased production, especially if the
revenues were directed toward them rather than away from them.

However,tgis

path is a highly unlikely one to be chosen because it would involve radical
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changes in the administr ative and political structure of the country.
The crucial question is how the new generatio n will view the alternativ es.
The Seven Year Developme nt Plan noted that "the young people for whom jobs
must be found everJr year for the next fifteen years have already been born.
Every year a given number of them "1'ill come forward to join the labour force.
This cannot be postponed by any law or policy ... "

The generatio ns that

created the political economy of Ghanaian independe Lce and who are now in
positions of leadershi p were formed by the Depressio n, the World War, and
the Cold War.

The coming generatio n has had an entirely different experienc e.

Its political economy will also be different .

The question is whether it

will place as much store on the developme nt planning from above that has
character ized most of Ghana's twentieth century experienc e.

-43TABLE 1 - THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR 1900-1960
Governn,ent Expenditure in
Constant (1953) Prices

Year

Index of
Government
Expenditure
per Capita
1953=100

Percentage
Distribution
of Government
Expenditure

Government
Revenue as
a percent
of exports

Total

Ordinary,
including
Public Dept.
Changes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1900

8.2

2. 3

5.9

72

0

46

44

1

6. 6

2.6

4.0

6i

2

38

90

2

9. 1

3.4

5.7

63

2

52

67

3

8.4

.4.6

3.9

46

5

47

58

4

5.0

4.5

0.5

9

10

27

48

1905

4,3

4. 0

0.3

7

10

24

35

6

· 4. 6

3.9

0. 7

15

10

25

32

7

4.2

3. 7

o. 5

11

10

23

25

8

5.1

4. 0

1.1

22

8

28

30

9

7. 6

4.5

3. 1

46

7

41

29

1910

6.8

4.3

2.5

37

7

34

36

11

6.0

4.3

1.7

29

7

31

29

12

6.2

4.5

1.7

28

7

32

28

13

7, 1

4.5

2.7

37

5

34

23

14

8.-2

4.9

3.4

41

6

40

27

1915

7. 8

5.4

2.5

32

8

37

23

16

5.1

3.7

1.4

27

8

24

30

17

4.6

3,7

LO

21

9

20

26

18

3. 3

2.8

0.5

15

9

15

28

19

3. 9

3.3

0. 6

14

7

17

22

ExtraorExtraorPublic
dinary and
dinary and
Debt
Development Development Changes
Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure)

-44TABLE 1 - THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR 1900-1960
(continued)

Year

Total

(1)

Ordinary,
including
Public Dept.
Changes

Index of
Government
Expenditure
per Capita
1953=100

Percentage
Distribution
of Government
Expenditure

Government Expenditure in
Constant (1953) Prices

Government
Revenue as
a percent
of exports

Public
ExtraorExtraorDebt
dinary and
dinary and
Development Development Changes
Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure )

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1920

7. 0

4.0

2. 9

42

7

30

28

21

13.6

6.8

6.8

50

6

58

39

22

15.5

10. 9

4. 7

30

7

65

39

23

10.7

5.5

5.2

48

8

43

39

24

12.5

5.9

6.6

53

7

49

36

1925

11.5

6.5

5.0

43

7

44

34

26

13.4

7.5

5.9

44

11

52

33

27

11. 7

6.6

5. 1

44

10

43

33

28

14.4

8.8

5.6

39

10

52

33

29

12.6

9. 2

3.4

27

11

45

33

1930

13. 5

10.6

3.0

22

11

47

38

31

11. 8

11.3

4

15

40

36

32

11.9

11.8

o.s
o. 1

1

18

40

39

33

10. 1

10. 1

·k

*

19

33

42

34

11.8

11. 7

0. 1

1

17

38

42

1935

12.8

12. 1

o. 7

6

16

40

43

36

14.7

13.1

1.6

11

14

44

37

37

13. 7

12.0

1.7

13

12

40

28

38

14.8

12. 7

2. 1

14

11

42

40

39

15. 7

13.6

2.1

14

10

43

34

-45TABLE 1 - THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR 1900-1960
(continued)
Government Expenditure in
Constant (1953) Prices

Year

Total

Ordinary,
including
Public Dept.
Changes

Index of
Government
Expenditure
per Capita
1953=100

Percentage
Distribution
of Government
Expenditure

Government
Revenue as
a percent
of exports

ExtraorPublic
Extraordinary and
dinary and
Debt
Development Development
Changes
Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1940

13.2

12.6

o. 7

5

9

35

33

l~l

10. 7

10.4

0.4

3

10

28

39

42

10.1

9.6

0.5

4

9

26

42

43

9,2

8.4

0.8

9

8

23

43

l}4

8.8

7,5

1.3

14

9

22

53

1945

11.0

8.3

2.7

25

5

26

54

46

11.5

9.2

2.4

20

4

27

43

47

15. 0

10.9

L1-.

2

28

2

33

18

48

15.9

12.0

3. 9

25

2

34

22

49

20. 1

14.6

5,4

27

1

43

75

1950

22.2

16.1

6.1

28

1

47

5l}

51

25.0

15.5

9.5

38

1

51

47

52

40.0

22.6

17.4

44

1

80

55

53

52.2

30.0

22. 2

43

1

100

65

5l}

64.3

36.8

27, L~ .

43

2

121

76

1955

89.3

50.4

30. 9

44

1

162

67

56

77, 6

47.6

29.9

39

1

139

50

57

77, 3

49.6

27. 7

36

1

134

72

58

98.6

58.9

39.7

40

1

166

72

59

116. 3

74.2

42.0

36

1

192

62
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TABLE 2 - FOREIGN TRADE INDICES OF GHANA
(1953 = 100)

Exports
Year

Volume

Value(in constant
pure has ing power)

Terms of Trade

1886

2

3

129

87

2

3

127

88

3

3

112

89

3

3

130

1890

3

5

184

91

3

5

169

92

3

5

162

93

3

6

186

94

4

7

179

1895

4

7

186

96

3

6

222

97

3

7

243

: '98

3

8

291

99

4

9

260

-47TABLE 2
--

- FOREIGN TRADE INDICES OF GHANA (1953 = 100)
(continued)
Exports

Imports

Year

Volume

Value (in constant
purchasing power)

Terms of Trade

Volume

1900
1
2
3

4
3
4
4
5

7
4
7
8
11

202
138
165
202
196

9
13
14
15

4L~

13

37

9
10
12

12
16
21
20
21

220
208
222
195
180

11
13
13
14
13

31
37
37
38
3"/

14

12
18
19
23
23

21
30
33
40
29

181
170
170
173
124

17
19
21
21
18

46
50
55
53
47

1915
16
17
18
19

30
27
37
26
59

42
34
27
10
28

142
127

18
23
14
10
19

43
55
34
23
43

1920
21
22
23
24

42
43
60
65

30
19
37
35
40

55
56

32
26
30
37
34

73
58
65
76

1925
26
27
28
29

72

43
47
59
57
51

60
62
84
77
64

41

82

38

77

52
54
46

100
100
86

45
37
43
40
46

66
46
57
51
56

43
25
32
30
32

78
44
56

lf

1905
6
7
8

9
1910
11
12
13

1930
31
32
33
34

6
8

73

77

70
75
80
67
81
76
78

82

72

40
46
71

43
71

Per Capita

27
39
42

71

so
52
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ml&_? , - FOREIGN TRADE INDICES OF GHANA (1953 = 100)
(contin ued)

Import s

Export s
Value (in consta nt
purcha sing power)

Year

Volume

1935
36
37
38
39

93
106
88
100
100

54

1940
41
L}2

43
44

Terms of Trade

Volume

Per Capita

82
57
65

59
67
93
57
65

53
61
75
46
45

85
94
114
69
65

85
84
56
74
77

55
43
30
25
24

64
51
52
34
30

32
25
28
23
23

45
34
37
31
29

86

42
49
63
98
66

31
36
45
53
77

4-3
53
61
87

72

38

1945
46
47
48
49

85
105

36
44
45
82
70

1950
51
52
53
54

104
95
91
100
92

107
103
91
100
152

104
108
101
100
166

79
85
86
100
97

86
90
89
100
95

1955
56
57
58
59

92
102
115
98
114

130
120
125
143
159

142
119
109
146
140

119
124
129
115
162

113
116
116
96
139

1960
61
62
63
64

131
157
174
164
162

162
139
145
144
148

124
88
84
88
92

178
183
156
179
160

149
148
125
139
122

91
72
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TABLE 1. - COCOA AND RAILHAYS
Year

Value o~ Capital
(millio: pounds)

Track Miles
Ope7.

Cocoa Carried by Rail
Tons

1900
01
02
03

N, A.

3J

1 8

12+
16'3

04

1.3

1905
06
07
00
09

1.3
1.8

1.s
1.8

1.8

1910
11

1.3

16:l
16'3
16,3
16'3
16!J
1613
183
22:~
227

Index of Tons per
Track Mile
1921/22 = 100

0
0

.1
.1
.1
.6

1
3

7
24
42
46

13
53
73
78

62

227

1915
16
17
18
19

3, 0
3. 2
3. 2
3. 3
3. :+

245
24G
26~}
269
269

60, 3
57,4
79,7
73.8
111.9

1920
21/;2
22/'23
23/2l:.

4.
6.
7,
6.
7.

269
276
33-'.i379
39/i-

95,5
109,l
173.1
164,3
156.1

39c'.145' 1
4GJ
500
50)

150. 3
149.2
131. 2
165.6
139. 5

2li/?5

19_25/?6
26/27
27/7.0
28/';:9

29/~·o

'!(

'+

8.0
8. 3
8,

+

9. .,l.
9,2

2
1
6
6
9

1.8

llf

7

*
*
*1

0
0
2

()

1.9
5. 1
20. 8
37. f..,
41. 1

2
l
')

0
0

•u

2. ')
2.~
2.6
2. 9

12
13

Percent of Total
cocoa exports
carried by rail

3

"

0

69

78
30
88
112

105

6l1-

90
100
108
110

74
82

59
75

100

96
83

69
84
71

90

02
60

69
64
62
74
59

Less than J,5•

The Percen 1 of Cocoa exports :arried by rail was obtained by dividing
coco~ carried b_ rail by value of ,;xports recorded for that year. Note that cocoa
carried by rail, ne year may not be carried until the following year.
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TABLE 3 - COCOA AND HAILHAYS
(continued)
Year

Value of Capital
(million pounds)

Track Miles
Open

Cocoa Carried by Rail
Tons

1930/31
31/32
32/33
33/3L~

34/35
1935/36
36/37
37/3G
30/39
39/40
191:.0/41
L:,l/l.:-2
l}2/Lr3

Inde,c of Tons per
Track Mile
1921/22 = 100

Percent of Total
cocoa exports
carried by rail

9. 3
9.3
9.3
9.2
9.2

500
500
500
500
500

132.5
123.5
122. 0
125.9
122.4

67
62
62
64
62

69
51
52
53
53

9.2
9.4
9. 3
8.7

130.6
140. 1
34.6
207. 3
115. 5

66
71

l:-5
li-5

N.A.

500
500
500
50()
500

18
105
58

15
79
l:-1

N,A.

N,A.

141. 7
131. 7
103. 6
184. 3

li-3/l:-l~

6l~

60
8l:-

99

44/l:-5

N.A.
N,A.

1945/l:-6
46/1+7
47 /L}G
l:.8/49
l}9/50

8.7
8.9
9.0
10. 0

635
636
639
641

182.3
129.2
177. 4
201. 8

1950/51
51/52
52/53
53/54
54/55

10. 0
11. 7
12. 6
14.3
17.1

642
643
646
654
675

193.0
168.5
164.l
141.3
159.9

60

1955/56

18.9
19.8
20.3
22.4
29.8

749
727
750
750
750

186.6
180. 2
155.9
176.6
225.5

63
63
53
60
76

56i57

57/53
53/59
59/60

N.A.

N,A.

73
52
70
80
76

66
64
55

The Percent of Cocoa exports carried by rail was obtained by dividing
cocoa carried by rail by value of exports recorded for that year. Note that
cocoa carried by rail one year may not be carried until the follo·wing year.

77

72
83
77

72
74
77

60
75
91
77

60
90
90

-51TABLE 4 - RAILWAY FINANCE 1921-39

Share of Freight Receipts

Freight Charges for Cocoa

Derived from Cocoa

as a Percent of the

.(Percentages)

Value of Cocoa carried
by Rail

50

4

21/22

57

8

22/23

56

7

23/24

55

8

24/25

49

8

1925/26

46

7

26/27

47

7

27/28

39

5

28/29

43

5

29/30

40

6

1930/31

47

7

31/32

56

12

32/33

56

12

33/34

57

14

34/35

44

13

1935/36

40

13

36/37

40

10

37/38

12

5

38/39

54

14

1920

-52TABLE 5
Government Revenue, Expenditure, Surplus and Deficit in
Constant (1953) Prices; 1945/46 to 1963/64

Consolidate d
Expenditure
Revenue

Year

*
Surplus/De ficit
Consolidate d Govt.
Central Government
Only

1945/46

15.0

11. 1

2.1

3.9

46/47

14.9

11.5

1.7

3.4

47/48

46.4

15.1

0.4

31.4

48/49

15.6

15.9

0.2

o. 3

49/50

45.9

20. 0

4.9

25. 9

1950/51
51/52

49,2

22. 1

4.3

27. 0

41.2

25.0

15. 1

16. 3

52/53

44.5

40.0

4.1

4.5

53/54

58.0

52.2

2.3

5.8

54/55

102.2

69.2

41.3

37.9

1955/56

72, 4

89.3

5.4

-16. 9

56/57

50.8

77.5

-6.9

-26.7

57/58

76.6

76.4

8.4

0.2

58/59

89.3

101. 0

5.6

-11. 7

59/60

81.4

112. 3

-6.8

-30.9

1960/61
61/62+

92,1

129.0

-28. 2

-36.9

104.6

177.6

-60.8

-72.9

62/63

88.9

157,7

-57.7

-68.8

131.4

170.9

-24.9

-37.4

63/64+

*Consolidate d

equals Central Government plus Cocoa Marketing Board, plus
Railways and Harbours, plus Local Government.
+15 month period.

-53FOOTNOTES

*This

essay is a brief summary of a larger book on the development

of the Ghanaian economy.

Its themes, like those of the book, are the

result of collaboration and discussion with a large ~umber of people.
At the very minimum I would like to acknowledge the contributions of
Reginald Green, Geoffrey Kay and Stephen Resnick.
Note: Until Independence of 1957 Ghana was known as the Gold Coast.
For simplicity we shall use the name Ghana throughout the text except
in direct quotations.
1
rhe theoretical framework underlying the analysis is spelled out
in S. Hymer ands. Resnick, "Interactions Between the Government and
the Private Sector, an Analysis of Government Expenditure Policy and the
Reflection Ratio" in Ian Stewart, ed., Report of a Conference (Edinburgh,
University of Edinburgh Press, 1969) and "Capital and Wealth in the DevelII

opment Process, Center Discussion Paper No. 63, Economic Growth Center,
Yale, 1969, mimeo.
2

Geoffrey Kay in the Underdevelopment of Ghana (Cambridge, Cambridge

University Press, forthcomming) spells out this argument in detail in
his introduction to a collection of historical documents and statistics
on the economy of Ghana.
311 1t is probable that the nation is advancing faster than may seem

good to the government who actually has had occasion to act as a brake
rather than an accelerating force.

11

A.H. Cardinall, The Gold Coast 1931
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Footno te 3 continu ed:
(Accra: Government Printin g Office, 1932).

Cardin all was a senior

colonia l civil servan t and head of the census.

This quote is taken from

his review of the develop ments during the Guggisb erg decade.

See also

and
the conclus ion reached by D. Walker and Cyril Ehrlich , "Stabi lizatio n
11
Develop ment Policy in Uganda : An Apprais al,· Kyklos,

1959,

11

Vol. 12, Fasc. 3,

the British admini strator often sees himsel f as a patern al pro

te·ctor rather than a revolu tionary ; taking pride to mainta ining peace
and order among primiti ve people rather than taking pride in those
people who are thrusti ng forward in an econom ic or politic al directi o~
and that of C,L,R, James, The Black Jacobin s

11

(New York, Vintage Books

1963), "Colon ialism Strang les the real wealth of the contine nt the

creativ e genius of the African people.
4

11

11
on the changin g econom ic structu re during the "openin g- up phase

11
see R- Szeresz ewski, Structu ral Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-19

(London : Weiden field and Nichols on, 1965); and Polly Hill 1s review in
Economic Develop ment and Cultura l Change, October , 1967. For a contem
porary view see Precis of Inform ation Concern ing the Colony of the Gold
Coast and Ashanti , 1904.
5 Joseph Chambe rlain, Secreta ry of State for the Colonie s, the House
of Commons, August 22, 1895.
The theory of trade was an obvious applica tion of the Recurd ian
law of diminis hing returns .

The protec tion of British capital from

Ghanaia n had strong overlay s of mercan tilism.

It might be noted, as

Douglas Rimmer points out in his analys is of "Schum perter and the Under-

-55Footnote 5 continued:
developed Countries," The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. 2, No. 5,
May, 1958, that Ghana was colonized not by British Capitalism in its
dynamic phase but by Capitalism in decline.
6The phrase is taken from A- McPhee, The Economic Revolution in
British West Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1926.
7 on the establishment of the Gold Industry see:
H- Bevin,

"M. J. Bonnat: Trader and Mining Promoter, " The Economic

Bulletin, Vol. I+, No. 7, July, 1960.
Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, Gold from the Gold Coast,
D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana

(1950).

(Oxford, Oxford University

Press, 1963).
8

see Elliot Berg,

11

The Development of a Labour Force in Sub-Saharan

Africe," Economic Development and Cultural Change, and "Backward-Sloping

Labour Supply Functions in Dual Economies - The African Case,

11

Quarterly

Journal of Economics, August, 1961, pp. 468-92.
The economic rationale for this policy was the theory of the back
·ward-bending supply curve of labour.

It was argued that because of the

economic backwardness and limited horizons of the indigenous population
the supply curve was highly inelastic and probably negatively rather than
positively sloped (at least until new tastes were acquired).
shift of demand, it was felt,

An outward

cause both a rise in wages and a decline

in the amount of labour available.

To overcome this problem, a policy

was advocated that would hold wages down to "reasonable" levels and shift
the supply curve outward.

In many parts of Africa, poll taxes,

land appro-

-56Footnote 8 continued:
priation, and other co~rcive measures were used to force the indigenous
population to leave the traditional sectors and work in the new European
sectors of China lo keep wages from rising.

It almost goes without saying

that the welfare of the labour force played almost no role at all in
colonial political economy.

It was only at the end of the thirties that

a labour department was established.

Its investigation revealed that

the circumstances under which migrant labourers came south searching for
jobs were frequently appalling.
As Orde Brmm,

The government had done nothing to help.

labour adviser to the Secretary of State for the

Colonies, noted in his analysis of the development of a Ghanaian labour
because of the ample supply of labour "the usual accompaniment of

force,

such development in the shape of recruitin~ organized transport, a written
contract, etc. did not appear... the innovation was consequently unobtrusive
and the Colonial Government reraained hardly aware of its implications.
11

•••

the position is therefore,

11

theoretically admirable with a floH

of entirely free labour, unrecruited and untrammeled by any sort of con
In practise, however, the worker is at great disadvantage and in

tract.

a far worse position than his brother in a country where adequate arrange
ments exist for t~e collectio~ trDnspor~ care and subsequent repatriation
of the worker."
Africe,
9

(HMSO,

G, St. Orde Browne, Report on Labour Conditions in West
Cmd 6277, 1941).

1904, Precis of Information Concerning the Colony of the Gold

Coast and Ashanti.

-57lOin this report the head of the department described his functions
as follows:
"The object of the department in its original conception was to obtain
control o:f: the bbour market so as to keep down the rate of wages, and
for this reason the departmeat has not failed in its object.

This has not,

however, bc-=n accomplished without great difficulty, and at one moment I
feared could not b2 successfully carried through the chief obstacle having
been the inJiscrimina::e way in uhich mining agents have raised wages.

11

Report of -::he Transport Depar'.:r,1ent, 1901.
11

For example, the most lucrative strike of all, the Ashanti Gold

fields, which has produced about one third of total gold output, was
secured by E.A. Cade in 1895 from a group of African concessionaries
(Kimble, p.13).

See Bevin for other information on the role of the

African middlemen.
12

on the amounts paid for concessions see H. Belfield, Report on

the Legis1£t ion '.";overning. the Alienation of Native Lands in the Gold Coast
Colony and Ashan~& H-!LS,Q., Cmd. 6278 (1912).
BeC',··::e of L1e system of private sale the chief beneficiaries on
the Ghar:.ai.'.El side were frequently not the people as a whole but the lawyers
who negot:i,.'.:ed the concessions and the chiefs and headmen who, as Belfield
notes,
13

frequently arrogated for themselves the profits from the concessions.
Frad:d gives a graphic description of the period:

"The potentialities of the field ,,ere introduced to Europe in the
usual fashion,

th.~t is, by an exaggerated,

quite unwarranted, and soon

exploded bocm in the shares of innumerable companies whose prospectuses

-58Footnote 13 continued:
portrayed a new Witwatersra nd.

It has been estimated that 321 companies

were registered up to June 1901, with a total nominal capital of over 25
million, of which possibly 15 million was issued."
There is no clear indication of the exact purpose for which, or the
exact geographica l area in which these companies were intended to, or
did in fact, operate.

There is no doubt that much of the issued capital

was never spent anywhere near West Africa in general or the Gold Coast
in particular.

In fact, notwithstan ding the repeated West African mining

booms and the considerabl e speculation in the shares of these companies,
it is highly significant that in 1904 there were only some 13 companies
which could report any gold production at all, and of these 13 there were
only 4 who returned an output worth more than 10,000 pounds.

14 see the information contained in the Award of the Arbitrator in
the Matter of a Trade Dispute Between the Gold Coast Mines Employees Union
and the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines (Accra, Government Printing Department,

1946) and the Mines Board of Inquiry (Accra Government Printing Department,
1957).
15

on the development of the Cocoa industry see Polly Hill, "The

Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, A Study in Rural Capitalism,

11

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), and R.H. Green and S,H, Hymer,
"Cocoa in the Gold Coast: A Study in the Relations Between African Farmers
and Agricultura l Experts, " Journal of Economic History, Vol. XX.VI (Septeciber,

1966), pp. 299-319.
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Neither were European merchants of much help.

They had little

direct contact with producers and, according to Polly Hill, "merely sat
on (or near) the port receiving the produce.
nor influenced the grmving of cocoa.

11

They neither encouraged

Polly Hill,

"Some Characteristics

of Indigenous West African Enterprise, " Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol.
VI, No. 2, 1962.

17 colonial transport
policy will be examined in detail ins. Hymer
and G, Kay,

"The Political Economy of Transport in the Gold Coast.

18According

11

to P.R. Geuld, The Development of the Transportation

Pattern in Ghana

(Northwestern University, Evanston, 1960)

p. 23, in

1900 surveys were made for three lines centering upon Accra, - one extend
ing Eastward into the Volta region, one extending Westward, and one extend
ing inland to Kumasi via Oda.

It is interesting to speculate what would

have happened if the Government had decided to build along these routes.
Ashanti would have been unaffected, the mining industry would have failed
to develop, the rich agricultural Eastern Region would have been far better
served, and Accra would have been a much larger urban complex.
19

Governor Clifford reports that when he arrived in the Gold Coast

in 1912 he was shocked by the costly head loading system.

"My earliest

preoccupation, therefore, on my assumption of the government of the Colony
was to endeavour to find some means of relieving the crippling transport
disabilities, the continuence of which threatened to render rapid progress

.
'lb e•
qui. t e imposs1.

II

Quote in R. E, Hraith, Guggisberg (London, Oxford

University Press, 1967).
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20
~ual Report of the D~partment of A3riculture, 1912.
21

Blue Book, 1914.

22Annual Report on the Eastern Province, 1912.
23

The Annual Report of ~he Department of Agriculture 1916, said the

crisis ''may not be unrai1rnd ble.ssing as it i-1ill no doubt temporarily, at

least, check further planting of cocoa and may have the result of aid
development or rescussitation of other products and be the cause of a
more ratioaal systen of farming.

11

In 1917 the report said "it is hoped

that the temporary adversity occasioned by the fall of the market will
more or less remedy uhat the lack of regulations has permitted, that the

area under cocoa will be reduced to a rational basis, the dangers of over•
production minimized and, possibly, that the people will be brought to
realize the necess:i.ty of personal application to work.

11

24
The departr.1ent 's analysis of the "problems" of the cocoa industry
and its suggested remedies are spelled out in Papers Relatin8 to the Cocoa
Industry, Sessioval Paper II of 1916-17; H,S.D. Tudhope, Director of
Agriculture, Enquiry into the Gold Coast Cocoa Industry, Interim and Final

Reports, Gold Coast Sessional Papers Nos. II and IV of 1918-19.
As these sessional papers show that though the department was objectively
inhibiting the d1~velopment o:[ l~hanaian enterprise, subjectively it thought
it was helping.
"West Xndian cocoa producers are either Europeans, or of European
e,ctraction, or are sufficiendy intelligent to accept European methods; the
producers of cocoa in this colony and Ashanti are natives in a most elementary
state of d.viliz:·:tion whose sole air.1, as yet, appears to be the attainment

-61Footnote 24 continued:
of a ma,dmum amount of money uith a minimum expenditure of energy, however
uneconomical the system, and whose lack of foresight for the future welfare
of the industry - and consequently of themselves - has not yet been compen
sated by adequate legislative measures .•. At St. Thome cocoa is better
than Gold Coast cocoa ·with the

S!] □e

labour.•. but these decided measures

of coercion obtain under European control."

(Sessional Paper II of

1916-17),
25 see

Green and Hymer for a detailed discussion of this issue.

For the C1ornent we mi13ht here note the cor.::nents of the authoritative and
Independent report in 1937,
"(It is) eJ{traordinary that until 1937 there was no single agricul
tural station in the cocoa belt proper at uhich research could be carried

out on the requirements of the crop.

It is difficult to see how any

officer of the Department could be e,{pected to offer correct advice on
cultural or other treatment, as he had no opportunity to acquire knonledge
under the local conditions.!' H,

c.

Simpson and E. M, Crowther, "Report

on Crop Production and Soil Fertility Problems,

II

Hest African Commission

1938-1939; Technical Reports (London: the Leverhulm Trust, Haterlou and
Sons Limited, 1943).
26
27

Annu81 Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1916.

Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1913.

28

Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1915.

-6229 we r.iight note in passing Polly Hill 1s comment that

11

the farmers

as businessmen were uninpressed by the colonial administration,
Hill,

"Gtanaian Capitalist Cocoa Farmers,

11

11

Polly

Ghanaian Bulletin of Agricultural

Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1, l-'.larch, 1962.

30D.

I(.

Greenstreet,

11

The Guggisberg Ten-Ye.ar Development Plan,

11

The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, VIII, No. 1, 1964, and R. E. t·Jraith,
Guggisberg (London, 02~ford University Press, 1967) are useful introduc
tions to the Guggisberc period.

(Neither of these take the negative view

presented here).
For contemporary statements see:
Gordon Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events 1920-27
(Accra, Government Printing Department, 1928).
H,

Q.

Newland, Hest Africa: A Handbook of Practical Information for

the Official, Planter, Hiner, Financer and Trader

(London, 1922).

H, G, Ormsby Gore, Report by the Hon. H, G, Ormsby Gore on his visit
to West Africa durinP, the year 1926, Cmd. 2744 (London, HMSO, 1926).
Allan 11cPhee, The Econooic Revolution in British Hest Africa, 1926.
(London, Oxford University Press, 1926).
L. c. A. Knowles, The Economic Development of th8 British Overseas
F.mpire, London, 1928.
A, H, CardinalJ.. The Gold Coast 193]

(Accra, The Government Printing

Department, 1932).

31 Guggisberg had returned in 1919 to the Gold Coast deeply influenced
by the trauma of his experience in the First World War, having ''made a
solemn vow to dedicate the rest of his life to the service of his fellow

-63-

Footnote 31 continued:
men,

(Wraith Guggisberg).

11

He knew the country better than most for,

as Assistant Director and later Director of Surveys
he had explored the interior intensively.

between 1902 and 1914,

By profession a military

engineer, rather than an administrator, he thought in terms of getting
things done and applyins science to nature rather than of simply main
taining order and authority.
"Hhatever decisions I raay be called upon to make I promise the people
of the Gold Coast that I will always be euided by the fact that I am an
Engineer, sent out here to superintend the construction of a broad Highway
of Progress along uhich the races of the Gold Coast may advance, by
gentle gradients over the Ridges of Difficulty and by easy curves around
the Swamps of Doubt and Superstition to those far-off Cities of Proraise •
the Cities of Final Developraent, Wealth and Happiness. "
Guggisberg's first address to the Legislative Council quoted in
Wraith (Guggisberg), p. 102.
32

The severe shocks of the First Horld Har and its aftermath left

an indelible marlc on colonial thinking.
sharply.

In 1917 and 1918 trade fell

"It may be counted as a blessing that the war was not postponed

for another decade when the Gold Coast peoples might have been so far
weaned from their old dependencies on the soil as to make the conditions
which existed in the early part of 1917 a source of real hardship" (Colonial Report 1919).In 1919-20 value of exports rose to unprecedented
heights only to fall sharply the folloi;Jing year when the price of cocoa
dropped.

Guggisberg was extremely perturbed by the boom and bust of 1919

to 1920. ('~twas indeed apparent that a large part of the Gold Coast people
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Footnote 32 contin11ed:
had lost their head. Hotor cars ~~ere purchased right and left, champagne
flowed freely, smoke of expensive cigars scented the air. If instead of
squandering their money they had put sClr.le by, the majority of those ~-,ho
took part in the boom l"lould have been comfortably off").

Legislative

Council Debates 1920-21.
33 Guggisberg, Le~islative Council Debates 1920-21, p. 6.
34For example, Guggisberg, in his 1921-22 address to the Legislative
Council noted that the government was only able to obtain 20 percent of
the carpenters, 15 percent of the masons and 15 percent of the painters
it required.

Legislative Council Debates 1921-22.

The government also exercised a certain degree of restraint in hiring
labour in deference to the fears of the mines who argued the government
program would aggravate their labour shortage.

See

Report of the Committee

Appointed to Advise the Government on the Question of Providing a Deep
lJater Harbour for the Gold Coast.
35

Sessional Paper No. VIII of 1920-21.

see for example the report of the Committee on Trade and Taxation

of the West African Colonies (1921) which concluded that the post-uar
reconstruction was undertaken "on too lavish a scale and .with too great
rapidity" and argued against export taxes since they would discourage
production.
36

A, McPhee, The Economic Revolution in West Africa, p. 69.
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To round out the irony, Guggisberg himself, after his brief

period of glory, ended as a failure.

He served for a short period as

Governor. of ;..Ghana but took sick and had to leave after seven months.
He never received another job and because he was a few months short of
ten ye::;rs service he never received a pension from the civil service and
only one month's sick pay.

See Wraith, Guggisberg, p. 327-337.

He lived

out the rest of his life in stringent circumstances (he died in 1930), re
membered and honoured only in Ghana.

38

For some members of the colonial civil service the retrenchment

beginning in the late 1920 1 s may have come as a relief.

("The past

decade has witnessed a rate of progress uhich mieht be even considered
dang2rous") - A.H. Cardinall, The Gold Coast 1931, since many felt that
Guggisberg's building plans and his plans for African advancement were
too ambitious.

Guggisberg was a progressive man in contrast to the rest

of the colonial civil service who, as Uraith has put it, "believed in
progress only when it was inevitable.·11

39

D, K. Greestreet, "The Guggisbers Ten-Year Development Plan, " p. 25

poin~s out that Karle Bu cost £254,000, Achirnola £607,000, while the
expenditure on government bungalows was £420,118.
40

Education was, of course, linked with politics since it was the

educated classes that articulated the opposition to colonialism, and
there had been a long running battle between Ghanaian intellectuals and
colo~ial administrators over what policy should be and how it should be
decirled.

The colonial administrators were unsympathetic to politics,

-66Footnote 40 continued:
"••• most people who know the Coast will agree that the African I s interest
in politics requires no awakening.

11

(

1

,1any are of the opinion that if

less attention had been paid to politics and more to the material im

provement of their resources, the Gold Coast would have been in a much
hisher position today..• politicai disputes have led to most disastrous
facts which resulted in actual loss of life and increased bitterness") Report of the Eastern Province 1923-24 - but they recognized its importance
and knew that it had to be dealt with.

In the colonial view the wise

and practical path to independence was to train a small educated elite
who could eventually take over the administrative structure and run it
as "efficiently" as European colonial officers.

The new education program

was therefore designed more to this end than ,1ith any idea of improving
economic productivity.

The elitist policy led predictably to a continuous

e~cess of demand for education over supply.

4111 It is doubtful, however, if· it would be wise policy to extend the
already large area under this crop necessitating the destruction of more
jungle or bush when already the danger of extensive clearings are becoming
apparent in a reduced humidity affecting the health of the cocoa trees, and
the rainfall in this country is so near the minimum necessary for the
successful growth of cocoa.

It is, however, recommended that the surplus

energy of the people should rather be devoted to the development of other
products.'' Agricultural Department. (Exact date missing).

In fact, the

country has since e,q,anded cocoa acreage enormously, without serious
consequences to the natural environment as far as has been scientifically
ascertained.
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r ·For examp·. L2, H. N. Ord, "Agricultural Commodity Projections, Real
Growth and Gains from Trade"
~5~

:.a

J.G. Steuart and H.H. Ord, eds., Interna-

African P~~~ary Produc~c and International Trade

(Edinburgh: The

Univcr-aity Press, 1965), p. El concludes "Ghana seems to have done better
from h::?r he,wy dc::-;endence on cocoa.•. than Uganda, with a more diverse
range of ag1·icultural conmodities.

11

t-3

'Pape~A Relating to the Petition of the Delegation from the

Gold Coast Colony, and Ashanti, Sessional Papers No. XI of 1934.

These

submiasions arguc.J for,

anongst: other things, an agricultural bank for

the benefit of fc::.:mers,

a coco8 advertisement fund,

ference with "full direct rep:resentation,

11

a twrld cocoa con-

encouragement of agriculture,

and t~ie tea•:hing of it as a special subject in Trade and Technical Schools,
and ·the introduction of manufacturing.

These papers serve as yet· another

demor:.:-tratiun th2'~ the coloni::Jl adr.1inistrations in fact had several known
altern:1tives befo1.e it and thnt its policies t·1ere the result of a deliberate
choice.
l;.l~In

other ,:olonies in Hest Africa the colonial administration dis-

courc:gcd European plantations.

This was not the case in Ghana.

At the

turn cf the centt>\-Y the colonial administration felt that the European
enter Jrise could play an impo,_·tant role in the development of agriculture
0

in Gh:s'1a a~.d in J.904 the government amended the Concessions Ordinance so
as not to a?ply t0 agriculture, thus removing the need for government
approval of land ~~ienation to Europeans in this sector.

At the same

time '.:~,e agricult'.::::al officers conducted experiments to demonstrate to
Euror-c~ns oa the profit.:::ble opportunities available in the country.

The

-68Footnote 44 continued:

activities are no·:: known; but in all about 16 or 17 European plantations
are referred to in the reports of the Depa:.:tment betwee11 1906 and 1920.
The e-;,:'..taph ot th:1.s strategy of relying on fore5.gn capital in

agriculture is foGnd in the followins paragraph repeated in each colon:i.al

report from 1932 until 1939:
'.I.'here have been but a few plantat:i.on ventures in the
in general, not been

Gold Coant and they have,

sufficientl y successful to encourage further developr;ient .
The foll in pr:l.ce of raw pJ:oc1ucts has nou rendered such
proposition s unattract:i.v e,
The reasons ,-1hy Em:opeans uere unl,blo to i.nt1.·oduce
methods in the Gold Coact

h:1V(!

t18,')

not been fully e):.plore<l.

crops and mo<lern
/lr1ong the Hkely

factm:s arc in2d~quE,te help· f:rom the i;overnmen!:" in eirper:!.ment ation and
f:l.nance~

a:1d the corapc1rative J.y h_igh ,:age rate prevailing :i.n Ghm1a as· a

result of :.:he dsm.:::ncl for labour by cocoa farmers.

Plantlltions in othor

parts of Africa did not usually face such ccr;::petition , and Here fm:tlrnr.
helped by poll ts:-rns and land exprcpdat:i.o n, 't·Jhich drove 'tl.:lges below the
opportun:U;y cost of subsisten~e farming unGer pre-colonia l concl:ttion.s.
lf5

It 't·Jould take too much space to doc:t,r;1ent these assert:i.ono here

since the b~sic mate;ial is contained in cumerous sessional papers and
dcp1:1rtmenta l n,ports and there do not yet exist adequate monographs t.m~
Blyz:tng the available information .

An atterr,pt to descr:lbe these va:dous

hnva a gr~ut copr~ enterprise
X of 192.1.-22) to thdr ultirrintc (k.,mise •.•

11

-69Footnote 45 conti~:
"on the 'tJbole it is unlikely that a large coconut industry can be founded
locally.

11

(Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture 1931-32) will be

undertaken in the larger book of which this essay is a summary.

For

the present the reader may be referred to Report of the Committee on
Agricultural Policy and Organization, Sessional Paper XVII of 1927-28;

o. T,

Faulkner and J. R, Nackie, Hest African Agriculture (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1933), a te,ctbook for colonial agricultural
officers ,1ritten in the early 30 1 s which in presenting the new approach
to acriculture in the colonies contains a penetrating critique of the old;
and the Simpson and Crowther report referred to above.

We might also note

the follm:·1ing statement, uritten in 195l:-, with its implied criticisn of
agricultural policy.

L\ccording to this source, Albert Smith "Farms and

Gardens to Supplement Rural Science Syllabus for ~1iddle Schools,

fpast Education, No,

11

Q2!;!

1, 1954, pp. 41-47.

In 1954 it ,1.:1s inpossible to teach improved agricultural practices
in schools because there lJere no improved techniques to teach.
"Some of the keener teachers have folloi,ed the
recor.unendation made some twenty years ago by the
Department of Agriculture.

At that time the Depart-

ment of Agriculture ,~as active in its work among schools.
It was confident that the senior classes of a primary
school could keep a small farm in continuous cultivation,
provided that the rotation used included certain cover crops,
then called green manures.
11

•••

11

In the course of time further research on basic

problem3 of soil fertility revealed that permanent
fertility could not be maintained soley by the use
of sho,.'t-terrn shallo1:-1 and rooted crops.

11

-70Footnote 45 continned:
"· .. Until systens of food farming which are an
improvenent on traditional systeras have been
reconne,,ded for genc:!:al adoption,

there is very

little schools can do about teaching or populariz
ing improved agriculture.

46

see Report

gf

11

the Commicsion on the Harketing of West African

~ • Nowell Repc.:·:: H. M. S. O. Cmd. 5845, 1938.

c. y,

Shepherd, Report on t:1e Econoraics of Peasant Agriculture in

the Gold Coast

P.T.

(Accra, Governr.:ent Printing Department,

1936).

Bauer, ~~st African 7 . ~ : A Study of Competition, Oligopoly

and Monopoly in a Ci.1anging Ecor.~my, Cambridge, 1954.
R. H, Green,

"Tne Hest Afri-:an Shipping Conferences and Ghana; Some

Aspects of Colonial Oligopoly .snd National Policy,

11

The Econor,1ic Bulletin

of Ghana, Vol. VIL:, No, 3, 1964.

47

Guggisberg, ~egislative Council Debates, 1923-24.

48

There was rai'-:h discussion in Central Ghana at the time of closing

these other ports :l.n order to protect Takoradi.

Because of political

opposition this war. not done until the Second Uorld War, and during the

twenties and thirt:i.es the Centrrtl Province Railway simply operated far
below capacity.

49The 1920 Amy::~al Report

0f the Eastern Region noted that "during

the year mechanica:i transport h.eis becor.1e e,ctremely popular.
it reported that

"~1

11

In 1922-23

minor induc-::.ry has sprung up and assumed considerable

proportions ... the :,·tmning of poPsenger and luggage carrying motor lorries

-71-

Footnote 49 continued:
between various ports.· 11

The next year it noted that the industry had grown

rapidly and that it was "possible to travel practically all over the
province 11 ; and in 1924-25 it told of "regular organized routes which run
on schedule,." covering the whole province.

Meanuhile, Guggisberg, Legislative

Council Debates, 1923-24 thought "it is obvious that motor lorries can only
be regarded as teraporary and inadequate measures in neeting the general
demands of trade in this country.

11

His view may be contrasted with that of Lieut. Col. Watherson, a Chief
Commissioner of the Northern Territories who in 1899 observed:
"The recent improvements in motor cars suggest these vehicles
as a means of transport vastly superior to carriers, and as
providing some at least of the advantages of railways without
any of their drawbacks.

Roads suitable for them can easily

be constructed,.,No ambitious bridging schemes need to be
thought out, for culverts can easily be made locally to
bear the ,-1eight of a motor car and its load

II

quoted in

Cardinal!, The Gold Coast, 1931, pp. 36-37.
In making his assessment Guggisberg was guided by data obtained with
difficulty from a feu large European transport companies.

Their method of

operations and costs bore little relation to those of the Ghanaian sector.
As late as 1928/29, uhen the average rate changed for Lorry Transport by
Ghanaians was about 7 pence a ton and there were reports of changes as low
as five pence, the representatives of the major transport £inns

11

spe21king

from intimate knouledge of the conditions on the road" said it could not be
done for less than 10 pence.

Report of the Central Province Trade Routes

Committee, Appointed by His Excellency the Governor,to Consider and Make
Recommendations Regarding: (i) Central Province Railway Rates; (ii) The
treatment of the Ports of Cape Coast and Saltpond on the Opening of Takoradi
1
Sessional Paper No. VI of 1928-29.

-72SO"The African lorry mmer is becoming z. problem on account of his
successful competition ·with the railway".•. Ro::id transport: of the Gold Coast
is excessively cheap and is actually run oc an une:onom::..-: basic (Colonial
Report, 1931-32).
5111The whole system of
motor transport :.:1 the Gold ::oast... if, indeed,
one can be said to exist ••. rests at present on sue~ an u~~conomic basis
that it is impossible for. the railway or other pro;:,erly organized or reg
ulated transport system to compete successfo·_;_1y;"

Repor~ of the Railway

Revenue Committee, Road vs Rail, Sessional ?;:;per No. 11 of 1932.-33.
52

see for example the elaborate discuss:.on on the _g~ilway Retrenchment

Committee 1931-32, n.eport and Recommendatio~1,2! Sessional Paper No. XIII of
1931-32.

The comnittee argued with respect to the request for lower rates

by the African Manganese Comr:iittee "the inportance to the Gold Coast of the
continuance of this industry is,

in the opin;;,,on of the Committee, too obvLous

to require to be stressed by them: a very considerable revenue raust flou
into the treasury as a result of the Compan:.,r I s ,-,age payra-:ats and the money
spent on its employees.

11

Ho\·1ever, with regarrl to Cocoa,

"He (Mr. Lewis)

assented that at existing rates all Ashanti traffic to and from the port of
Takoradi uould travel by rail if that form o~ transportat::ton were possible •••
The General Manager did not deny that as a :::.::te on raw p:::-~ducts exported in
bulk, the rate of cocoa from Kumasi to Takor;:;di (81s 9d) was high. He
stated, however, that he would be unable to replace by rn~_lway earnings
the loss which would accrue from even a sma:U reduction of. railway rates on
cocoa from Ashanti.

In the circumstances, t.l:?. Cor.ioittee -:an make no rec

ommendation for such a reduction at the pree~nt tiDe • 11

-7353 s
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discrioinati:m.

On s:.:udyinc th'.'! ,llap o:: the Colony it t1ill be seen that the

road system iu Ash[.n::i and the Western Provin=e was developed with due regard
for the :i.n'.:~:r..:sts of the Railw;Jy ,ihich there preceded th9 roads.

In both

these Adr.1.inis-::rationn th9 roads :-.-:e compleraer:tary to, and not competitive
with, the R~il~;ay, end the result of tM.s system ~Jhich does not provide
direct a=ceos to Takoradi

by roGd, is that of a total rev~nue of £756,540

obtained £re~ coods traffic; in 1930-31 no less than £487,766 or 64.4
percent was derived from traffic eit:1er fon1arded fro..i or received at
stations on the s2c-::ion of line bot~1.:::cn Kuahu Pahsu and Benlma where, as
has been ind:l.cated,

the1.·e is l:'.t·::le com;,:ietition b2tueen road and rail.

In the Eestern and Central Provinces,

Oil

of road 1:md reihn-;:y constructior,, 'i.s d:.:.fferen'.:.

the other hand,

the history

For variot.•s reasons

the Accra-Kt1r,1~si ;:ailuay ,1as b:1:·.J.t in comparatively short sections, a
consid~rable r,eriod elap:.iing i:'.'!:":,,:--:!er-: "::be completion of one section and
the commencern~nt of another,

r:s·man, Mangoclse, Koforidua, Tafo, and

Ansinam bee.:;·-;:.:! in their ::urn rni. 1. het'ds, ar:.d from each of these towns
were conctr'..!r.ted feeder roads.
Nkawkat1

rosd)

:;-n rn;;.ny cases (i.e. the Koforidua-

these roads nm i;,arallel to the railway and, not having

been abando:,.cd wit:. t~.e extens)o~ of the line but on the contrary improved,
they n0i·7 pro·;_ride :':or the transpo1:t by road di:.:ect to and from Accra of
cocoa and ether fre5-::;ht r71:J.ich ~:?r2 formerly carried by the railway.

541 ~t has been a?plied so

aG to prohibit the carriage of cocoa to

the coast by road 3;,1d the carrio8C o~ imported goods a~.d :-eer by road from
the coast to L\shanti.

There c::~ 16 ::,~ctions of road to which these

-74Footnote 54 continue d:
prohibi" :ions apply.

These are equipped ·with barriers at uhich vehicles

passin3 through are inspecte d and recorded by the Police,

This system has

nm·1 bee:1 in use for nearly ten years and in spite of the objectio ns that
can be raised to it in principl e,

in fact it uorks and is generall y

understo od - and for that reason accepted ;

11

Report of the Road-Ra il Trans

port Committe e, Session al Paper No. VI of 1945.

55 neport of the Road-Ra il Transpo rt COt!lr.littee.
Also John H, Dalton,
Policies "

''Gold Coast Economic Developm ent: Problem s and

(Unpubli shed Ph.D. disserta tion, Univers ity of Californ ia~ 1955),

p. 48 reports he learned this from intervie us with official s in the road
division of the public "t-10rks departm ent.

See too the United African Company,

Statisti cal and Econoraic Review, No, 2, p. 39 which claims there "were

even instance s of the removal of road bridges over roads ..• "t-1bether this
was the intentio n or not it effectiv ely discoura ged the use of roads for

the transpo rt of goods."

Gould, The Developm ent of the Transpo rtation

Pattern in Ghana, pp. 70-71 details some of these restrict ions.
56

The gains frora trade within Ghana is one of the most sadly neglecte d

areas of research and policy.

Until recently ,

feu attempts were made to

measure this exchange . (No census of agricult ure was taken before 1960) and
the national accounts assume that per capita producti on of "traditi onal" goods
(includi ng food) remains constan t through time, - one of the most patently
absurd and profoun dly misleadi ng represen tations of the economic developm ent
in Ghar,a that one could imagine. In fact,

the groHth of the cocoa economy

wrough~ a profound change in the structur e of producti on in rural areas by
opening up opportu nities for internal speciali zation and exchange in food and
other commod ities.

-7557 The attitude towards Nor'.:herners is bitterly summed up in the Report
of the North'l~rn Te_::

2:.!£!Y

of th'.":. Gold Coast for the year 1937-38,

'7hey ,;;::re re8arded as an amiable· but backward· people,
t~seful :is soldiers, policanen and labourers in the
mines ;:__ ,d cocoa fares; in short,

fit only to be

Iiewers of uood and C:rawers of water for their brothers
:.':1 the Colony of As:1:intL "
On the neglect of t"1e North see also J. R.

Raeburn: Report on a Preliminary

Economic Survey of ~:he Northern Terr:i_tories of the Gold Coast, London,
Colonial Office, lSJl.
J.M. Hu::1.ter,

"3easonal Hunger in a Part of the West African Savannah:

A survey of body WE:ights in Nangodi, N. E, Ghana,

11

Transaction s of the

Institute 0£ __ )3ritif·~1 Geographer:::, , No. 41 (June 1967).
"Populat:.on Prc3sure in a Part of the l-Jest African Savannah: A study

,
of Nangodi, Northei:.st Ghana, " A~nals of the Association of American Geogra2hers
u
•

Vol. LVII (March 1967).
58 Similarly, the Western part of the country has remained far less
prosperous than the Eastern prooably due to inadequate raods.

The Western

Province ha<l the port of Takoradi, the Railway and the Mines, but these did
not bring developm,---,t .

The 1920 Report of the Western Province noted that

with the end of Ra:'..lway Constru..:tio n and the Mining boom "the energies of the
province had come to an abrupt ·i:ermination and the native has since been
content to sink ba,:;it into a sta.:e of complete lethargy."

See also Guggisberg 's

comments 'As regarc'.3 transportr.~i on, the Western Province of the Colony is
still far le;,s developed than any other part of the Gold Coast, and this in
spite of its having had for nearly twenty years a railway with a terminal
port.

1

Gugg::sberg. Legislative Council Debates,

1920-21.
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Bulletin of the Gold Coast Department of Agriculture , No. 19

(1930)

p. 9.

60In the 30 's .:md 40 's as the mystique of the early years
by the breakdown of the old internation al economic system.

lt1as

destroyed

colonialism

·was subject to a searching review by numerous committees, commissions,
and independent scholars.

In addition to the reports referring specificall y

to Ghana cited above, the reader is referred to the following important
evaluations of the experience under "paleo colonialism " 1900-1939:
W. l{. Hancoclc, A Survey of British Commom,eelth Affairs, Vol. 11,
Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939, Part 2 (London, Oxford University
Press, 1942).
~lan Pir;J, The Financial and Economic History of the African Tropical
Territories

s. H.

(O,~ford, Oxford University Press, 1940) •

Frankel, _Capital Investr.1ent in Africa. (Ne,·1 York, Oxford University

Press, 1938).

W. M. MacMillan, African Emergent, Penguin Books, 1949.
Rita Hinden, Plan for Africa, London: Allen and Unwin, 1941.
Kuame NkrUI'i1ah, Touards Colonial Freedom.
61

(London, Heinman, 1962).

A major part of the country's private capital stock is held by

Ghanaians in cocoa, transport etc.

However, large scale organization s and

concentratio n of ca~ital are nearly all European and middle scale business
is heavily dominated by Lavantines.

Though there are some fairly large

Ghanaian capitalists, they are still few in number and provide only a slender
base for further development .

See Industrial Statistics 1958-1959 and

Industrial Statistics 1965-66 issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics,

-77-

Footnote 61 continued:
See also Peter C, Garlich, African Traders in Kumasi

(Accra I Economic

Research Division, University Colleee of Ghana, 1959).
A, Ngpan, Market Trade: A Sample Survey of Market Traders in Accra
(/,ccra: University of Ghana, Economic Research Division 1960) and Polly
Hill, "Some Characteristics of Indigenous Hest African Enterprise,
Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. VI, No, 1 (1962).

11

Polly Hill also has

a number of other unpublished papers on Ghanaian capitalists in fishing,
cattle, trading and lorry transport.

62

It should be noted that Ghana was not in fact integrated into the

international econoray but uas tied to the British colonial tradinc neti:-1ork.
Atter 1930 this netuork considerably restricted the trade of the colonies.
63

1t must be stressed that the use of the words "development planning"

to describe the economic policy of the government in this period is a
gross misnomer.

There was no plan in the sense that a choice i:-Jas made to

achieve desired ends.

The plans were for the most part little more than

a capital budget for the government sector constructed by asking each
department to subrait its plans for the next year.
co-ordination or choices made.

There was almost no

Moreover, little attention was paid to

targets, and the ones alluded to in Government statements - diversification.
industrialization, stabilization, development, welfare - were rhetorical
ones entirely remote from the immediate and practical problems facing the
country and impossible to approach let alone achieve in the time periods
under consideration.

It is significant that as Omaboe points out the

government did not even use the available statistics on the economy in

-78-

Footnote 63 continued :
making decisions let alone call for more.

E. N, Ornaboe, ''Some Observati ons

on the Statistic al Requirerae nts of Development Planning in the Less Devel
oped Countries ,

11

The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, No, 2 (1963).

This made it extremely difficult for planners after 1960 when the
governmen t began a concerted effort to gain some control over the economy
for they had to begin almost fror.1 scratch in obtaining data on agricultu re,
industry, employment, national accountin g, etc.
64The bacl.groun d of the plan is contained in a number of Sessional
Papers produced during the uar under the authorshi p of the Governor, Sir
Alan Burns.

See Developme nt Schemes, Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1943;

~

peneral Plan for Developme nt of the Gold Coast, Sessional Paper No. 11 of
1944, and the associate d Sessional Papers, numbers III, IV, V, VII and Vlll
of 1944 dealing uith specific schemes.

The plan was based on the assumptio n

that the annual revenue of the colony would rise to £7,750,00 0 by 1956•57.
This ·was a conservat ive estimate and allowed for surplus funds so that
contingen cies could be met and iJould not result in breaking the plan.
It is interestin g to note that in the po1twar period the French
governmen t called for similar developme nt plans from its colonies.
The parallel action is perhaps explained by wartime collabora tion :in London.
See Robert F, Meagher, "Bilatera l Aid to Africa, "

Columbia LalJ School,

mimeo.
65 see David Apter, Ghana in Transitio n (Ne,·1 York: Atheneum 1963)
and Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (London, Oxford Universit y
Press,196 4) for an analysis of the politics of this period.

-79Footnote 65 continl'.ed:
The Ree_~rt of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold
Coast 1948 C.he Wat2on Rc;:>ort) &ppointed to investigate the riots, contains
an extensive· analysis of the country 1 s economic problems.
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Road to Independence

(Paris, Mouton 6: co.,

1964).
66

Expenditure for the 1951 plan was set at £76 million.

to a five yec.: plan in 1954,

When changed

the figure was revised to £81 million.

67 The arguments were first
put forth in the Watson report and then
developed wit~1 greater rigour by Seers and Ross.

Report on the Financial

and Physical Problems of Development of the Gold Coast (Accra: Office of
the Governmc:t Statistician, 1952).

68

See Arthur Hazelwood,

"Colonial External Finance Since the Har,

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXI,
69

11

1953-54.

The decision to accumulate reserves in Government hands was, and

continues to be, tte subject of an intense debate on the behaviour pro
pensities of African capitalists and governments and the appropriate balance
between the two.
P. T. B2•,f:!r, and R. H, Paish,

"The Reduction of Fluctuations in the

Incomes of Pl'imary Producers, " _Economic Journal, December 1952, pp. 750-80;
Polly Hill,

"5'luctuations in Incomes of Primary Producers,

11

Economic Journal,

June 1953, pp. 468-· 71 and "Fluctuation in Incomes of Primary Producers: A
Connnent,

11

Ec9nomic Journal, September 1953, pp. 594-607;

M,

Friedman,

"The Reduct:..nn of Fluctuations in the Incomes of Primary Producers: A

-30Footnote 69 continued:
Critical Comment,

11

Economic Journal, December, 1954, pp. 698-703;

B, M, · Niculescu, "Fluctuations in Incomes of Primary Producers: Further
Comment," Economic Journal, December 1954, pp.730-43;

P. T- Bauer, irThe

Reduction of Fluctuations in the Incomes of Primary Producers Further
Considered;." Economic Journal, December 1954, pp. 704-29;

E,K, Hawkins,

''Marketing Boards and Economic Development in Nigeria and Ghana, " Review
of Economic Studies, October 1958, pp. 51-62;

David Walker and Cyril

Ehrlich, "Stabilization and Development Policy in Uganda: An Appraisal, "
Kyklos, Vol. 12, Fasc. 3, 1959;

R, H, Green, "Some Current Problems in

the Cocoa Industry, _11 The Economic Bulletin, May 1961, pp. 16-32;

J. Hilliams,

''The Economy of Ghana" in Calvin B, Hoover, ed., Economic Systems of the
Commonwealth (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1962);

G.K. Helleiner,

"The Fiscal Role of the Harketing Boards in Nigeria Economic Development,
1947-61;" Economic Journal, September 1964, pp. 582-610.
70 R. Szereszewski, "Capital and Output in Ghana 1955-1961, " Economic
Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. VI!, No. 4 (1963) estimates that capital grew at
87~ output at 5%, and labour at 2%.
71 statement by the ne,·1 military government on Radio Ghana shortly
following the coup.
72The most comprehensive survey of the structure of the economy during
this period is found in the essays by Szereszewski and Killick in H. Birming
ham, I, Newstadt, and E.N. Cmaboe (eds.) A Study of Contemporary Ghana
(Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1966).

A contemporaneous

account of these difficulties can be found in the Official government publi-

-81Footnote 72 continued:
cations and-particularly the annual Econonic Surveys which each year
docur.tented, criticized, and questioned the problems of the country with
extraordinary candor.
73 New York Times, March 6, 1966.
74

on the question of the d !vision of labour in capital formation

between the governnhmt and the private sector see W. A,. Lewis, Report on
Industrialization in the Gold Coast (Government Printing Office, Accra
1953) for an extensive analysis and the vim-, "there is no doubt in the
,;niter I s mind that the Gold Coast Government can do more for development
by spending its money on expanding the public services, uhich are t'10efully
inadequate, and on quadrupling that part of its agricultural services
which relate to food production for the local r.iarket." Lewis foresaw

that

if the government did its job properly it would attract foreign capita1
which in turn would create Ghanaian capital via a demonstration effect.
He might note as an incidental fact that the Hatson Report felt that:
emphasis should be placed on co-operatives since "unbridled private
enterprise ,10uld, at best, lay the foundation of future social strife,
75

11

The new strategy is contained in Program of the Convention People's

Party for Work and Happiness. (Government Printer,Accra, 1962) and in the
plan itself The Seven Year Development Plan 1963/64 to 1969/70.
E.N. Omaboe in A Study of Contemporary Ghana;

See also

"The Process of Planning.

11

For an analysis of the major economic and political factors behind
the change in strategy see B. Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana:End of an
Illusion

(Neu Yorl<, Nonthly Review Press, 1966}

St. Clair Drake and Leslie

-82Footnote 75 .:-ontin".~ d:
Alexander kr.y,

"Govenune nt Versus the Unions: The Sekondi Takoradi Strike,"

1961, in Giv':"ndale.'.l H- Canter, ed., Politics in Africa

(New York, Harcourt,

Brace & WorlL, Inc .. , 1966); Ann Seidman, Econoraic Developme nt in Ghana
(Ph, D. Dfr:,.ertat ion, Universit y of Hisconsin , 1968); R. Geroud,

1951-65

Nationalis m ,:-,nd Developme nt in Ghana, lilew York, Praeger, 1969.
76Afric:~

Mus,: Unite, pp. 119-120.

77

New York Ti0~, March 6, 1966.

78

R. Geroud, i~ationali sm and Developme nt in Ghana places great emphasis

on the time factor in interpret ing Nkrumah's "grandios e" schemes.

He argues

the problem of national independe nce is not to keep the colonial system go
ing or to improve it but to change it.

Nkrumah first went easy in order to

win independ,m ce and connolida te pm·1er.

He then devoted all the resources

he could command to changing the frar:1e,-10rk of the country by starting
projects on 1111 fronts,

creatin3 a ne,-1 physical infrastru cture and introducin g

new ideas about wh<,re Ghana should go.

This strategy involves the high

Jisk that it ~1ill not bear fruit before the slack of the old systen is ex
hausted.

In fact this happened in Ghana partly because of the falling cocoa

prices and partly Jecause a structura l change in an underdeve loped country
is inherentl y wasteful and inefficie nt.

Nonethele ss the strategy was partially

successfu l f:,:om Nk1·umah 1 s point of view because his incomplet ed projects
provided the framc:7ork for the neJct round.

The post-Nkrum ah governmen t has

started fror., the £-::ructure created by Nkrumah rather than the colonial
structure he inhe1.:ted .

To put this another uay, no one would deny that

Ghana, becaese of mcrumah, is radically different from the Gold Coast or
fron1 other fonner British colonies in Africa.
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,:Jhat has tak en oth ers a
hu nd red yea rs to acc om pli
sh.
Ci vil ser va nts , the ref ore
, mu st dev elo p a new ori
en tat ion ,
a sen se of mi ssi on and
urg enc y, to ena ble the m
to eli mi na te
all ten de nc ies tow ard s
red tap eis rn, bu rea ucr acy
and wa ste .
Ci vil ser va nts mu st use
the ir ini tia tiv e to make
the civ il
ser vic e an eff ec tiv e ins
tru me nt in the rap id dev
elo pm ent
of Ghana. 11
Th ere wa s als o the co nfl
ict on the na tur e of "so
cia lis t" dev elo pm ent in
Gh ana . See J,H . Me nsa h's
Pr esi de nti al Ad dre ss to
the Eco nom ic So cie ty
in 196 4 and the rea cti on to
it in the Sp ark .
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.A. Ki llic k,

"Th e Po ssi bil iti es of Eco
nom ic Co ntr ol" in A Stu dy
of
Co nte mp ora ry Gh ana ; Da
vid Din on, "F isc al and Mo
net ary Po lic ies in Re lat
ion
to the Sev en- Ye ar De vel opm
ent Pla n of Ghana, 11 Econor
1ic Bu lle tin of Ghana,
Vol. VII, No, 4, 1963;
Ro ber t U. No rri s, "On Inf
lat ion in Gh ana " and
Do ugl as A. Sc ott , "E xte
rna l De bt Ma nag em ent in
a De vel opi ng Co unt r~ "
in
Fin anc ing Af ric an De vel opm
ent , ed. by Tom J. Fa ner
(Ca mb rid ge: M, I, T, Pre ss,
196 5).
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Tbe sys tem of im po rt co
ntr ols see ms to hav e bee
n esp ec ial ly sev ere on
sm all sca le Af ric an bus
ine ssm en who had gre at
dif fic ult y com ply ing wi
th
bu rea uc rat ic res tri cti on
s.
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sta tis tic s on the inc om
e dis tri bu tio n of Ghana
are no t ye t av ail ab le.
Bu t sta tis tic s fro ra oth
er co un tri es sus ge st tha
t the top ten pe rce nt of
ho use ho lds rec eiv e abo ut
one thi rd of the tot al
inc om e and the top for ty
pe rce nt abo ut tw o-t hir ds.

